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Despite strong negative demand and supply shocks, Sweden succeeded in the 1970s and 
1980s to maintain low rates of unemployment. In these decades, however, Sweden 
displayed low GDP per capita growth in comparison with other OECD countries and also 
relatively high inflation, especially during the second half of the 1980s. In the early 1990s 
the country experienced an economic crisis without correspondence in other OECD 
countries with the exception for her neighbor Finland. During the crisis politicians, 
economic experts and social researchers abroad announced the death of “the Swedish 
model”. The obituary of the model was written by people with disparate theoretical 
orientations and social values.  
 
Sweden’s macroeconomic development since the mid-1990s, including her fast recovery 
from the Great Recession, made foreign observers inclined (once again) to consider the 
country as an example worth following. Today, Sweden occupies, like the other Nordic 
countries, a top position when countries are ranked in terms of macroeconomic stability, 
international competitiveness and sustainable growth. Some observers highlight the 
advantages of the “old” Swedish or Nordic model combining openness with generous 
welfare programs, active labour market policy (to increase labour mobility) and income 
equalization (Pontusson 2006, Gylfason et al. 2010). Other observers refer to the 
beneficial effects of a new Swedish model with larger income differentials, deregulation,    3 
e.g. the promulgation of private provisions of welfare services, reductions in taxes, lower 
compensation rates in the social insurance systems, and strict rules for fiscal and 
monetary policies (Erlandsen and Lundsgaard 2007, Hüfner 2007, Lindbeck, 2007, 
Fregert and Jonung 2008). The Nordic countries are still among the OECD countries with 
the smallest income gaps (both before and after taxes), the largest public sector (although 
Norway has low public expenditure in relation to GDP), the highest labour-force 
participation rates and the strongest position for organized labour (OECD 2010, Table I 
and Table B, OECD 2011 Table 25 and 26, Statistics Sweden 2006, 11, Visser 2006, 
Table 3). However, with respect to income distribution, labour legislation, public 
employment, income taxes and economic policy, the Nordic countries converged to the 
OECD and EU averages in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
This chapter focuses on the introduction of a new economic-policy regime in Sweden in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Deregulation of financial, product and labour markets and rule-
based macroeconomic policy are paramount features of the new regime. The Swedish 
adjustment in the 1990s and 2000s to international theories, ideologies and agreements 
shall not conceal, however, that the macroeconomic development in the country was also 
affected by the priorities and institutions of earlier economic-policy regimes, primarily 
“voluntary” incomes policy and active labor market policy (ALMP). The notion of a new 
regime will be used to describe Swedish economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s despite 
the fact that there were relics of older strategies in the new strategy. There were also 
some turbulent years before all parts of the new regime was in place. A distinction will be    4 
made between the phases where the new strategy was developed (1992-1997), fully 
applied as a routine (1998-2007) and seriously tested (2008-2011).  
 
The chapter has also the ambition to disentangle strategic factors behind the deregulation 
and change to a new macroeconomic policy in Sweden. It emphasizes the negative 
experiences of economic policy in the past and of disappointing events, primarily the 
deep, basically Swedish (or Nordic), recession at the beginning of the 1990s. In the 
analysis of the reorientation of economic policy and structural reforms in Sweden the 
focus is also on the import of new economic theories, the professionalism of economic 
policy, EU integration and the declining influence of LO, the central blue-collar 
confederation. These phenomena will be considered as prime driving forces, thus each 
determinant have an independent status, at least partially, to other political-institutional 
and economic-structural conditions and the macroeconomic development in Sweden in 
the 1990s and 2000s. For example, new macroeconomics was obviously an exogenous 
determinant of Swedish economic policy. Earlier economic-policy doctrines had largely 
been based on ideas developed by the Stockholm School of Economics in the 1930s and 
1940s and by trade-union economists in the early postwar period, see the Rehn-Meidner 
model. The fact that the new macroeconomic theories were developed by Anglo-
American economists makes it reasonable to consider them as independent of the actual 
economic development in Sweden. 
 
A further aim of the chapter is to assess the importance of the new economic-policy 
regime for the apparent macroeconomic success of Sweden in the 1998-2007 period. The    5 
chapter stresses the lack of serious demand and supply shocks at the international level. 
Furthermore, high Swedish growth reflected some favorable economic-structural 
conditions that are not necessarily related to the new economic-policy regime. The 
chapter sheds light on the role of the ICT sector for the “productivity wonder” and also 
for the low inflation in Sweden in an international perspective. Restrictive monetary 
policies e.g. reflected that the Swedish Central Bank underestimated the ICT sector’s 
productivity growth. Monetary restraint largely explains why the Swedish success under 
a new economic-policy regime was less obvious in terms of unemployment.  
 
The chapter finally evaluates the performance of the new economic policy regime in 
Sweden in the 2008-2011 period. Monetary policy was facilitated by the change from 
stagflation to recession in this period and fiscal policy by the initial public budget 
surplus; this surplus was not primarily the result of the fiscal rules implemented during 
the second half of the 1990s but of the public budget crisis in the early 1990s. By a 
combination of earlier fiscal consolidation, government bailouts in the financial sector, 
countercyclical monetary policy, flexible exchange-rates and luck Sweden could avoid an 
economic crisis in the late 2000s similar to that in the early 1990s. But Swedish 
unemployment was high at the end of the 2000s, especially by national standards. In fact, 
in the late 1990s and the 2000s, Sweden neither succeeded in returning to the low 
unemployment rates of the 1980s (and the earlier postwar decades), nor belonged to a 
group of OECD countries with the lowest rate of open unemployment. 
 
    6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW ECONOMIC POLICY REGIME 
 
A brief description of the old regime 
 
Economic policy in Sweden during the 1980s was shaped by the profit crisis, the losses 
of Swedish market shares and the emergence of a structural public budget deficit during 
the second half of the 1970s. After OPEC II, centre-right and social democratic 
governments abandoned their Keynesian policy after OPEC I of maintaining low rates of 
unemployment by stimulating domestic demand.  (The Swedish governments in the 
postwar period are surveyed in Appendix 1.) Swedish fiscal policy was predominantly 
tight in the 1980s in order to reduce the deficits in the public budget and the current 
account and also to speed up the transfer of resources to the exposed sector. To boost 
profits in the exposed sector and increase Swedish market shares the social democrats 
devalued the SEK (the krona) in 1982. Together with the devaluation by a non-socialist 
government the year before the SEK was reduced by 26 per cent in relation to the 
currencies of competing countries. Monetary policy was tied by the Swedish unilateral 
system of fixed exchange rates on an increasingly global financial market. During the 
first half of the 1980s, both non-socialist and social democratic governments introduced 
extensive ALMP programs to fight unemployment in line with the Rehn-Meidner model. 
 
By giving priority to full employment the social democrats eventually abandoned their 
plans to link the SEK to the German Mark after the 1982 devaluation. Instead, the 
government tried to fight inflation during the Reagan boom and in the aftermath of the    7 
devaluations by pleading the central trade unions for wage moderation and by declaring 
that new devaluations were excluded. Sweden gradually switched to a hard-currency 
policy although the policy was not institutionalized until the early 1990s. In the late 
1980s, the main argument for fiscal restraint by the social democratic government was to 
cool down overheating. But there was a growing skepticism among leading social 
democrats and their experts towards discretionary economic policy. The gradual change 
to hard-currency policy, but also the deregulations of domestic and foreign capital 
markets by the social democrats during the second half of the 1980s (see next section), 
were the first indications of a new economic-policy regime in Sweden. 
 
The components of the new regime 
 
The two devaluations (1981-1982), the long international boom, the dismantling of 
restrictions on bank lending (1985) in combination with a tax system favouring 
borrowing led to severe overheating in Sweden. During the second half of the 1980s 
share prices and prices in real-estate markets skyrocketed. A substantial part of 
investment in stocks and commercial building were directly financed by new financial 
instruments and institutions (Ingves and Lind 1998). A bubble in markets for stocks and 
commercial buildings in particular reinforced the tendency to overheating in the Swedish 
economy. The subsequent collapse of Swedish stock and housing markets (including 
commercial buildings) was unleashed by an increase in (West-)German long-run interest 
rates (1989-1990), the bankruptcy of some new financing companies (initially Nyckeln), 
leading to credit losses and lending restrictions by the commercial banks (Autumn 1990),    8 
and by an international recession (1990-1991). In 1992, liquidations and financial 
problems for surviving companies elicited, as in Norway and (especially) in Finland, a 
bank crisis in Sweden. A tax reform 1990-1991 contributed to the fall in Swedish stock 
and housing prices by making it less favorable to borrow. 
 
Negative wealth effects of falling prices on stocks and houses and lesser household 
confidence (e.g. through higher unemployment) initiated a dramatic reduction in private 
consumption 1991-1994.
1 Private consumption was further hampered by the increase in 
international (German) interest rates in 1992 having a negative effect on households’ 
liquidity and a positive effect on their incentives to repay loans. Furthermore, the 
simultaneous decline in domestic and foreign demand caused a reduction in Swedish 
investments 1991-1993 by 38 per cent in the business sector and by 35 per cent in the 
total economy, a much larger decrease than in all other OECD countries except Finland 
(OECD 2003, Table 5). The lower rate of inflation in 1992 contributed (together with 
sluggish nominal interest rates) to the fall in Swedish investments by leading to higher 
real interest rates.  
 
The change to flexible exchange rates in November 1992 was one pillar of the new 
economic-policy regime in Sweden. A regime shift in Swedish economic policy had 
already occurred through the gradual change to hard-currency policy in the 1980s. This 
policy became more explicit after the elimination of the currency controls in the late 
1980s. In October 1990, a social democratic government had faced a speculative attack 
                                                 
1 The tax reform 1990-1991 had negative effects on household liquidity and created incentives for 
repayment of loans. But these negative effects on aggregate demand were neutralized by the fact that the 
reform was underfinanced.    9 
against the SEK. The government responded by announcing a restrictive fiscal program 
and a Swedish membership in the EU; Sweden formally applied for membership in the 
summer of 1991. In May 1991, the social democrats tried to restore the lost confidence in 
the SEK by linking it to the ECU. In 1992, the higher interest rates in Germany (related 
to the unification) and global recession tendencies led to unrest on European financial 
markets. The currency crisis in September 1992, when Sweden was ruled by a centre-
right coalition government, induced new speculations against the SEK. During two days 
the Central Bank’s prime interest rate soared to the record level of 500 per cent. When 
the SEK was under a new attack in November 1992 the Central Bank decided (in fact 
before having consulted the centre-right government) to let the SEK float.  
 
With flexible exchange rates and free capital movements across borders monetary policy 
attains a central role in the stabilization of output and employment (see the Mundell-
Fleming model). But the switch to flexible exchange rates in Sweden was followed by a 
decision by the Central Bank in January 1993 to adopt an inflation target of 2 per cent 
allowing a deviation of 1 percentage points in both directions. The target was used a 
guideline for Swedish monetary policy from 1995. Furthermore the Central Bank had 
gradually become more independent in the 1980s and 1990s. Its independence and 
superior goal of price stability were finally legally settled in January 1999.
2 In February 
1999, the new Executive Board of the Central Bank added that monetary policy should 
also consider the stability of the real economy although without jeopardizing the inflation 
target. Negative supply shocks shed light on a real conflict between the goals of low 
                                                 
2 There is an immense literature on the ranking of central-bank independence. Most of the rankings are 
based on data before the central bank reforms in the 1990s. It seems, however, that Sweden in the late 
1990s belonged to a group of OECD countries with medium independence (Masłowska 2007, 33).    10 
inflation and output stability in economic policy. Today, the Swedish Central Bank 
advocates the use of flexible inflation targets by minimizing a (quadratic) loss function 
namely the deviation of (expected) inflation from the target and (expected) GDP from the 
potential level. Monetary policy might give priority to the stabilization of GDP and 
employment, thus the target of 2 per cent inflation must not be satisfied in the short run 
(Svensson 2010, 60-62, Ingves 2011).  
 
Swedish monetary policy was cautiously expansive in 1993 and then restrictive 1994-
1995. Inflation had decreased radically in 1992, but increased again during the following 
year. The Central Bank wished to tame inflation expectations in general and, specifically, 
to counteract the inflationary tendencies through the weakening of the SEK (and the 
expansionary fiscal policy). In the first year with flexible exchange rates (1993), the SEK 
was depreciated by 25 per cent against the currencies of competing nations, a weakening 
of the SEK similar to that after the devaluations in the early 1980s. The Central Bank saw 
the growing gap between Swedish and German interests in 1994-1995 (after a decline in 
1993) as an indication that global financial markets had still weak confidence in the 
ability and willingness of economic policy-makers in Sweden to reduce inflation.  
 
In the 1990s, there was also a change in the guidelines for and orientation of Swedish 
fiscal policy. It was primarily a centre-right government (1991-1994) that had to face the 
deep Swedish recession. The previous social democratic government had been occupied 
with the task of combating overheating and its consequences and was thus unprepared to 
meet the dramatic downturn in the economy until it fell in September 1991. During the    11 
currency crisis in September1992 the centre-right government tried, in collaboration with 
the social democrats, to please financial actors by a crisis package aimed at improving 
Swedish competitiveness (mainly reductions in payroll taxes). This response to the crisis 
followed the economic-policy routine of the 1980s focusing on Swedish market shares. 
The SEK was definitely overvalued at the beginning of the 1990s. But undoubtedly 
politicians and their experts overreacted on the loss of Swedish market shares (volume) in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s ignoring that the worsening of the current account (and the 
higher nominal wages) at that time reflected domestic overheating. Furthermore, the 
export decline during the international recession 1990-1991 was a catalyst, not a major 
explanation, for the Swedish crisis.
 3   
 
A second crisis package by the centre-right government together with the social 
democratic opposition in late September 1992 contained extraordinary measures to 
improve the public budget balance (primarily increases in consumer taxes and reductions 
in public transfers). In 1992, worse business-cycle conditions (see built-in stabilizers) and 
bank subsidies to avoid a collapse of the Swedish financial market had resulted in a large 
budget deficit for the consolidated public sector. Swedish politicians felt impelled to 
improve the public budget balance by deflationary fiscal measures. They suspected 
(probably correctly) in late September 1992 that the growing budget deficit had 
contributed to the weak confidence in the SEK among financial actors.  
 
                                                 
3 But by her specialization in business-cycle sensitive products (raw materials and investment goods) and 
automobiles, Sweden was particularly hard hit by the international recession in 1990-1991.    12 
Notwithstanding the fiscal austerity measures in Autumn 1992 the public budget deficit 
in Sweden approached a percentage share of GDP in 1993 that could only be compared 
with that in Greece at that time. The centre-right coalition government was too divided to 
implement a restrictive fiscal policy until the final year in power (1994). According to 
OECD estimates, in 1992-1993, expansionary fiscal policy was almost equally 
responsible as built-in stabilizers for the Swedish public budget deficit (OECD 2003, 
Table 28 and 29). For example, the bank support in 1991-1993 amounted to 65 billion 
SEK.  The social democratic government succeeding the centre-right coalition became 
the main actor in the endeavours to reduce the Swedish public budget deficit and public 
debt. The tight fiscal policy 1994-1998 implemented primarily by a social democratic 
government was the main reason why the deficit for the consolidated public sector 
disappeared in 1998.  In fact, the fiscal austerity measures in Sweden in the mid-1990s 
had no correspondences in other OECD countries from the early 1970s (from which time 
statistics are available) until the 2008-2011 period (Erixon 2010, 696-697) and it was 
combined with a restrictive monetary policy 1994-1995 (see above). The restrictive 
economic policy when the rate of unemployment was still high, especially by national 
standards, was a significant departure from Swedish economic policy since the early 
1930s.  
 
In the 1990s, there were also some new institutional conditions for fiscal policy in 
Sweden. The progressive taxes had been reduced and the tax based broadened through 
the tax reform 1990-1991. A budget reform in the mid-1990s accepted by both the centre-
right coalition and the following social democratic government restricted the possibility    13 
for the Parliament to increase public expenditure by a breakdown of the budget items (see 
also the section on the strategic role of professional economists, below). Furthermore, 
when regaining power in 1994, the social democrats introduced rules for fiscal discipline. 
In 1995, they decided to put a ceiling on expenditure by central government; the rule was 
applied from 1997. The same year the social democratic government also introduced a 
fiscal target for the consolidated public sector requiring a surplus of 2 per cent of GDP 
over the business cycle. The reduction of the target from 2 to 1 per cent in 2006 was not a 
softening of the target. Rather, it was the result of EU regulations requiring that certain 
parts of the pension system should be included in the private sector. Finally, in 1997, the 
social democratic government decided to restrict the extent to which local and county 
governments could pass budgets with a deficit. The new law, introduced in 2000, stated 
that local and county governments must eliminate budget deficits within two years.  
 
The introduction of explicit domestic fiscal rules was not general in the OECD countries. 
Some of the EU countries that later became members of the EMU are not governed today 
by any domestic fiscal rules (Ireland, Italy, France and Greece). Furthermore, the 
Swedish rules were more explicit, radical or adopted earlier than the corresponding rules 
in other European OECD countries (see CESifo 2009). For example, Norway had no 
fiscal guidelines until 2001, and the country has still no expenditure target. Besides, the 
construction of the Norwegian rule makes fiscal policy expansionary when oil prices are 
increasing (Jafarov and Leigh 2007). Danish governments make up medium-terms plans 
for the public budget balance but are not ruled by any fixed budget or public expenditure 
targets.  Finland has had a spending limit system for central government since 1991, but    14 
no domestic rules for the public budget balance thus the country is here a follower of the 
EU Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
Deregulation was another component of the new economic-policy regime in Sweden in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The deregulation of domestic capital markets in the mid-1980s was 
soon followed by the dismantling of currency controls. From 1987 there was no longer 
any obligation for Swedish companies to finance foreign direct investments by foreign 
capital. The deregulation of Swedish currency markets were completed in 1989 as all 
restrictions on Swedish citizens’ purchases of real estates, stocks and bonds abroad were 
terminated. The character and timing of financial-market deregulation in Sweden was 
similar to that in Norway and Finland.  
 
Through a social democratic proposition in the early 1990s the agricultural sector became 
more deregulated in Sweden than in most other European countries. This sector was 
regulated again when Sweden joined the EU in 1995. But Sweden had entered the road to 
deregulation of markets for products and services by privatization and the elimination of 
legal barriers to price competition and market entry. In 1991, the social democratic 
government decided to allow private employment services including companies hiring 
out workers (bemanningsföretag). In 1993, the subsequent centre-right government 
extended the possibilities of private employment services. In the 1991-1994 period, the 
centre-right government also deregulated the markets for telecommunication, transport 
and electricity. A similar regulation wave did also take place in other OECD countries 
(including other Nordic countries). But it seems that the deregulation of these markets    15 
was earlier and more far-reaching in Sweden than in other OECD countries, including 
other Nordic countries with the exception for Finland (Erlandsen and Lundsgaard 2007, 
Figure 17, Hüfner 2007, 7). Deregulation continued in Sweden under minority social 
democratic governments 1994-2006, primarily supported in Parliament by the Green 
Party and the Left Party. In 2003, Sweden and the other Nordic countries excluding 
Norway were, together with the Anglo-American countries, the most deregulated 
economies in the OECD.
4 Sweden was also an early mover in permitting private 
provisions of collective services such as health, children and elderly care and education. 
In the late 1990s and the 2000s, the production of welfare services in Sweden was still 
predominantly organized by the public sector (Erlandsen and Lundsgaard 2007, 26, 38). 
But the share of private (independent) schools at the upper secondary level increased 
dramatically in these decades, from 10.9 percent 1995/1996 to 48.2 percent 2010/2011. 
Today (the academic year 2010/2011) private schools enroll 23. 8 per cent of the students 
at this level (Ekonomifakta 2011, Swedish National Agency for Education 2011, Table 
4A). 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s deregulations also affected the Swedish labour market. (We also 
include under this term changes in the social insurance system affecting the wage floor.) 
The unemployment benefit ratio was reduced from 90 per cent to 80 per cent under the 
centre-right coalition government 1991-1994. The social democrats made a further 
reduction in unemployment benefits in 1995 (to 75 per cent), but they restored the initial 
                                                 
4 See Erlandsen and Lundsgaard 2007, Table 18. According to the OECD index, in 2008, product 
deregulation in Sweden was only slightly above the OECD average and less than that of the other Nordic 
countries including Norway (see Wölfl et al. 2010, 7-8). The change in Sweden’s deregulation status 
between 2003 and 2008 probably reflected the revision of the indicator system rather than real changes.    16 
(centre-right) level (80 per cent) in 1997. In 2001, the social democrats differentiated the 
compensations by raising the benefit ceiling in the beginning of the unemployment period 
and reducing it after a certain time lapse (20 weeks). But the ceiling on earnings eligible 
for unemployment benefits reduced the overall effective replacement ratios from the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s (see Bennmarker et al. 2007, 89-90). Furthermore, the 
present centre-right coalition has introduced an unemployment benefit system where the 
benefit levels are reduced from 80 to 70 per cent and finally to 65 per cent with the 
duration of unemployment. Finally, the ceiling 18 700 SEK per month remained 
unaltered. This disconnected the unemployment benefit from earlier income for the 
majority of the population. (The average income for full time work in Sweden was 
25 800 per month in the mid-2000s.) In the 2000s, the Nordic countries except Sweden 
were in the group with the most generous unemployment benefits in the OECD although 
there was a drastic reduction in the Norwegian unemployment net benefits in 2008 
(OECD database, Net replacement rates (NRR) over a five-year period following 
unemployment, 2001-2009, OECD 2009, Table 1.6). 
 
Furthermore, the present centre-right government in Sweden has reduced the sickness 
compensation. A reduction in the ceiling from 33 000 SEK per month to 25 000 SEK per 
month in October 2006 was a challenge to the principle of income-related compensations 
in the Swedish welfare system. The government also reduced the benefit ratio from 80 to 
75 per cent after 1 1/2 year of sickness. There was also a time limit, 2 ½ year, in the new 
system. In 2010 the majority of people who were still sick after 2 ½ year entered an 
ALMP program called the Job and Development Guarantee where the compensation rate    17 
is 65 per cent. 
 
Job security was also reduced in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s. The Job Security Act of 
1994 was in fact a break with the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement. The Agreement stated 
that labour conflicts, e.g. over wages and job security, should be resolved by collective 
bargaining, not by non-neutral legislation. The Job Security Act entailed that the last 
recruited employees must be dismissed first. The non-socialist government decided in 
1993 to exclude two wage earners from the principle of “last-in first-out”. This exclusion 
was immediately abolished by the following social democratic government. But in 1996 
the social democrats allowed short-term employment contracts as an exception from the 
Act. Further exceptions were made under the social democratic government in 2001 due 
to a short-lived parliamentary alliance between the Green Party and the centre-right 
parties – the exemption of two persons from the “last-in first-out” principle was 
reintroduced in firms with less than ten employees. Finally, notwithstanding the 
commitments to job security by the largest party in the centre-right coalition from 2006 
(Moderata Samlingspartiet), the possibilities for employers to hire temporary workers 
were extended (in 2007). According to a OECD measure, among the member countries, 
only the Mediterranean countries had more job security than Sweden in 1990. In 2008, 
job security in Sweden had fallen below the OECD average and was e.g. lower than that 
in Norway and Finland. Swedish job protection was particularly low for temporary 
workers (OECD database Strictness of Employment Protection). Besides, the Job 
Security Act is a dispositive law, thus it can be revoked by local agreements between the 
companies and the trade unions.    18 
 
Thus, the new economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s was constituted 
by a deregulation of financial, labour and product markets and a departure from 
Keynesian discretionary economic policies. But these features of a new regime were 
combined with some reminiscences from older economic-policy routines. It may be 
legitimate to refer to a Swedish version of the new consensus on economic policy 
encompassing ALMP measures and “voluntary” incomes policy.  
 
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s Swedish economic (and wage) policy was inspired 
by the Rehn-Meidner model. The model advocates restrictive macroeconomic policy over 
the business cycle (in the medium term), e.g. to provide space for expansionary fiscal 
policies in a (deep) recession, wage policy of solidarity and ALMP programs. In the case 
of ALMPs, the founders of the model referred to selective (instead of aggregate) stimulus 
of labour demand, including regional policy, but primarily to supply and matching 
oriented measures in labour markets. In order to improve the matching process the Rehn-
Meidner model further recommends high unemployment benefits (Erixon 2010, 679-
681). The macroeconomic policy of the model was not fully applied in the postwar 
period. But the breakthrough of ALMPs in Sweden in the late 1950s was legitimized by 
the founders’ argument that these measures would result not only in low unemployment 
(and equity) but also in low inflation and structural change. The Rehn-Meidner model is 
similar to the Danish flexicurity model advocated by the EU commission in the late 
2000s. The macroeconomic policy of the Danish flexicurity model is unclear. Moreover, 
the model’s view of coordinated central wage bargaining may differ from that in the    19 
Swedish model. In the Rehn-Meidner model wage coordination is a necessary condition 
for solidarity wages, thus for attaining uniform wages for similar work.  
 
There was a strong emphasis on ALMP projects in Sweden also in the 1990s and 2000s. 
In fact, there is no parallell in other periods to the expansion of ALMPs under the centre-
right government in 1991-1994. In 1994, 7.3 per cent of the total labour force was 
engaged in ALMP programs. During the 1992-1997 period ALMP expenditures as a 
share of public total expenditure and GDP was higher in Sweden than in any other OECD 
country especially after adjustment for the rate of unemployment. Through the strong 
support from the political parties, the central labour-market organizations and the 
electorate and through the expansion of the National Labour Market Board (AMS) in the 
1960s and 1970s ALMP measures had largely been institutionalized in Sweden.  
 
“Voluntary” incomes policy is another reminiscence of an older economic-policy regime 
in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s. True to the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement wage 
restraint by trade unions showing concern about macroeconomic stability is the typical 
incomes policy arrangement in Sweden in the postwar period. Social scientists consider 
the absence of compulsory (legislative) incomes policy as a unique Swedish feature even 
in a Nordic perspective (see Vartiainen 2011). In the early postwar years wage 
moderation by central trade unions was an essential component of a Keynesian strategy 
to combine expansionary fiscal and monetary policy measures aimed at full employment 
with price stability and external balance (under fixed exchange rates). In the 1980s, wage    20 
restraint was also expected to stimulate employment by its positive effect on Swedish 
market shares. 
 
Swedish “voluntary” incomes policy in the postwar period did not exclude that labour 
market organizations were under strong pressure from governments and public agencies 
to accept moderate wage increases. Furthermore, tripartite negotiations about wages (and 
taxes) took place under exceptional conditions in the 1970s and 1980s, first after OPEC I 
(the so-called Haga agreements) and then in the boom of the 1980s (the so-called 
Rosenbad rounds). In the latter case, informal discussions between central trade unions 
and the social democratic government in the mid-1980s defined a wage ceiling that was 
soon broken by market-induced local wage increases, so-called wage drift. The most 
obvious departure from the Saltsjöbaden Agreement occurred at the highest point of 
overheating (1990). The social democratic government proposed an income-policy 
arrangement including price and wage freezes and also a ban on strikes. But the 
proposition was rejected in Parliament leading to a government crisis and the resignation 
of the Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt. 
 
Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s coordinated wage agreements between the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv, formerly SAF) and the white 
collar and blue collar organizations respectively were conditional for Swedish incomes 
policy. Since 1983, central wage increases have been determined, with some exceptions, 
at the industry level. In the deep recession of the early 1990s central labour market 
organizations agreed to follow the recommendations of low wage increases by a newly    21 
appointed government wage committee, the so-called Rehnberg commission. The social 
democratic government had plans in the mid 1990s to make a more definitive departure 
from “voluntary” incomes policy by tripartite wage negotiations. The combination of 
industrial central agreements and the depreciation of the SEK had prompted high nominal 
wage increases in export industries. (Profits’ share of value added in Swedish 
manufacturing rose to record levels for the postwar period in the mid-1990s.) However, 
“voluntary” incomes policy was integrated in the new stabilization-policy regime by an 
agreement between the employer organizations and the trade unions in manufacturing.  
 
The so-called Industrial Agreement in 1997 embraced both white collar and blue collar 
workers in manufacturing. From 1998 to 2010 wage agreements in manufacturing were 
made for three-year periods.  These agreements have correspondences in other parts of 
the Swedish labour market. But they were expected to serve as a wage norm for other 
sectors making it possible to internalize negative wage externalities at the industrial level 
in the Swedish case. Through the set up of governmental wage mediation body in 2000 
(Medlingsinstitutet), all institutions for incomes policy in the new Swedish economic-
policy regime were installed. 
 
The labour-market partners in Swedish manufacturing have officially declared that they 
are following the wage norm of wage increases at a European level in order to maintain 
Swedish competitiveness. But public agencies have replaced this rather anachronistic 
wage norm under the new economic-policy regime with a recommendation that wage 
increases must be compatible with the Central Bank’s inflation target. The National    22 
Institute of Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet) maintains that collective wage 
setters can reduce equilibrium unemployment provided that the (short run) wage 
increases do not threaten the Central Bank’s inflation target (National Institute of 
Economic Research 2011, 8-9).  
 
Thus the Swedish incomes policy of the 1990s and 2000s shared the idea with the 
incomes policy of the 1980s that wage restraint has a positive effect on employment. But 
the suggested underlying mechanisms differed. In the 1980s, high nominal wages were 
expected to lead to losses of market shares and therefore to lower employment unless the 
government devaluated the SEK or pursued an expansionary fiscal policy. In the early 
1990s, these last resorts were excluded by the explicit hard-currency policy. The 
adherents of this policy also emphasized that high nominal wages would reduce 
employment by inducing increases in the long-run interest rate reflecting a weaker 
confidence in the SEK. In the present economic-policy regime, employment will be 
reduced by a restrictive monetary policy if wage setters are shooting above the inflation 
target. With flexible exchange rates the competitive strength of the exposed sector could 
possibly have been restored by depreciations.  
 
Living in the shadow of a deep crisis and other bad experiences 
 
The change in Swedish economic policy in the 1990s cannot be understood without 
references to the deep economic crisis at the beginning of the decade. The fall in Swedish 
GDP growth in 1991-1993 was larger than that during the Great Depression in the early    23 
1930s.
5 And the employment decline was the largest ever in the history of Swedish 
industrialism (Edvinsson 2005, Table 9.7 and 9.12). Furthermore, Sweden, famous for its 
ability to sustain full employment during the turbulent years of the 1970s and 1980s, 
experienced an increase in open unemployment from 1.7 per cent in 1990 to 9.3 per cent 
1994, a rate only 1.5 percentage points lower than the EU average according to 
standardized OECD data.  And there was no decrease in Swedish unemployment until 
autumn 1997. Thus, Sweden, the very example of full employment, had entered the road 
to mass unemployment although the rate was much lower in Sweden than in Finland in 
the 1992-1997 period (see Table 1* in Appendix 2). Moreover, during the first half of the 
1990s, there was a dramatic decline in labour force participation rates, although from a 
high level, in Sweden. This decline primarily reflected an increase in early retirement and 
long-run participation in ALMP programs. 
 
Sweden’s change to flexible exchange rates in November 1992 is partly explained by the 
globalization of financial markets leading to strong speculations against the SEK in a 
situation where financial actors thought that its value was too high. But the depth and also 
the timing of the economic crisis in Sweden, occurring in a period of turbulent global 
financial markets, explain the sudden change to flexible exchange rates in the country. 
The currency crisis in Sweden in November 1992 was triggered by the combination of 
strong recession tendencies, a bank crisis and a rapidly increasing public deficit. In 
Denmark and Norway, the recession was earlier (in the 1980s) and milder than in Sweden 
                                                 
5 In 1990-1992, Sweden fell from the 6th or 8th to the 16th position in the ranking of OECD countries in 
terms of GDP per capita levels (there are two PPP measures). Sweden has not yet regained its former 
position in the economic “welfare league”. In 2010, Sweden was ranked number 10 among the OECD 
countries (on both PPP measures), see OECD database, Purchasing Power Parities for GDP and related 
indicators.    24 
and Finland. And Denmark did not experience any financial crisis at all. These Nordic 
differences must be an important part of the explanation of why Denmark chose to keep a 
system of fixed exchange rates, while Norway changed to flexible exchange rates one 
month later (in December), and then returned to fixed exchange rates already in May 
1994 (although the new Norwegian system provided room for corrections of the 
exchange rate). In Norway, inflation targets were not introduced until 2001. Finland, that 
experienced the worst recession and bank crisis among the Nordic countries, had already 
switched to flexible exchange rates a few months earlier than Sweden. In fact, the change 
to flexible exchange rates in Sweden were not initially considered by the non-socialist 
government or the Central Bank as a component of a new economic-policy regime but as 
an exceptional measure during an economic crisis. The country should return to fixed 
exchange rate once the value of the SEK had been adjusted downward and the crisis was 
over.  
 
By contributing to the large deficit in the public budget the deep recession in the early 
1990s was also important for the very restrictive fiscal policy in Sweden in the middle of 
the decade. The fact that there is no parallel to this fiscal policy in other OECD countries 
until to the Great Recession 2008-2010 indicates that Swedish economic policy in the 
1990s was shaped by the depression at the beginning of the decade. The crisis also 
reinforced the negative view among Swedish politicians and economic experts of past 
economic policies. The conventional wisdom in the 1990s was that exchange-rate and 
fiscal policies in the 1970s and 1980s had been too expansionary (or not restrictive 
enough) contributing significantly to inflation and overheated financial and housing    25 
markets. Thus, despite the fact that mainstream macroeconomics have difficulties 
explaining overinvestment and financial bubbles, Swedish decision makers and their 
economic advisors suggested that the sources of the crisis in the early 1990s could be 
found in 1980s. They conjectured (probably correctly) that the deep crisis in the early 
1990s was not primarily the consequence of contemporary negative demand shocks but 
of positive demand shocks in the 1980s.  
 
Overheating and inflation in the 1980s and the following deep recession in the early 
1990s (e.g. influencing the conventional view of the earlier economic policies) can also 
explain why fiscal rules were implemented in Sweden but not in all OECD countries and 
why these rules were stricter or introduced earlier in Sweden than in other OECD 
countries. Fiscal targets were not introduced at all in, for example, Denmark, a country 
that had not experienced any public budget or financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Empirical evidence that fiscal rules were endogenous rather than prime driving 
forces behind fiscal policy in the OECD countries (OECD 2007, 220) underpins the 
hypothesis that the Swedish budget crisis in the early 1990s was decisive for the 
implementation (and timing) of fiscal rules in the country. Furthermore, Sweden’s history 
of high inflation and the crash landing of the economy in the early 1990s contributed to 
the strong priority of price stability in the country in the 1990s and 2000s manifested by 
the Central Bank reform (cf. Hayo and Hefeker 2001, Daunfeldt and de Luna 2008) and 
the restrictive monetary policy in the country given its inflation target (see the section 
“Was Swedish macroeconomic development caused by the new economic-policy 
routine?” below).     26 
 
Furthermore, extensive regulation of product market and services in Sweden during the 
first half of the 1990s must be seen against the background of the deep recession at the 
beginning of the decade. A plausible hypothesis is that the recession created “a crisis 
consciousness” and focus on short-run macroeconomic problems in the debates on 
economic policies that facilitated the introduction of radical structural reforms.  This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that deregulation in the first part of the 1990s was 
more radical in Sweden and Finland than in other OECD countries including Norway and 
Denmark. Another plausible hypothesis is that Swedish deregulation reflected the 
country’s poor growth performance in the 1970s and 1980s. Economic experts saw 
deregulation as a necessary device to increase productivity and GDP per capita growth 
after a period with a Swedish growth lag behind other OECD countries (Productivity 
Commission 1992, Lindbeck 1997).  
 
New economic thinking 
 
The fact that a new economic-policy regime was also introduced in countries without any 
deep recession at the beginning of the 1990s and with various experiences of economic 
policy in the preceding decades indicate that theoretical and ideological factors mattered 
(see Blyth 2001). What is more, in Sweden, new economic thinking about the limitations 
of discretionary Keynesian policies shaped the decision makers’ view of past economic 
policy. The devaluations and high inflation in Sweden in the 1980s were probably a 
salient explanation for speculators’ mistrust in the SEK in Autumn 1992. But it can be    27 
argued from the abandoned Keynesian perspective that a more ambitious countercyclical 
fiscal policy (and revaluation of the SEK) could have prevented overheating in Sweden 
during the second half of the 1980s. And after all, Swedish inflation was only 
systematically above the OECD average in the 1988-1991 period.
6 What is more, the 
victory of new economic ideas obscured that the public budget crisis in the early 1990s 
would have been milder if Sweden had followed the Rehn-Meidner recommendation of a 
restrictive fiscal policy in the medium term (which had called forth a more restrictive 
fiscal policy in the 1980s). And it could have been maintained on Keynesian grounds in 
the early 1990s that high inflation was the price that must be paid to achieve very low 
rates of unemployment in Sweden in the 1980s.  
 
When explaining the shift to a new economic-policy regime in Sweden our emphasis is 
on theory rather than on ideology.
7 The new neoclassical synthesis (consensus) in 
macroeconomics is based on the theory of rational expectations and the neo-Keynesian 
theory about wage and price rigidities (or imperfections on capital markets). Advocates 
of the new synthesis use concepts such as NAIRU and the natural rate of unemployment 
(or equilibrium unemployment) to underline that rational expectations undermines most 
attempts to affect employment by changes in aggregate demand. It is even more unlikely 
                                                 
6 In fact, in 1985-1991, that is in period of severe Swedish overheating, the difference between Swedish 
and (West-)German interest rates fell from above 8 per cent (short-run interest rates) and 6 per cent (long-
run interest rates) to approximately 2 per cent (both interest rates). Moreover, on unclear grounds, the gap 
between Swedish and German long-run interests more than halved from the end of 1990 to Summer 1992, 
immediately before the Swedish currency crisis. 
7 Our main argument for downplaying the role of ideology is that there was no substantial difference in the 
support for the new economic-policy regime during the 1990s and 2000s between the non-socialist parties 
and the social democrats in Sweden (see further above). What is more, the new regime was also introduced 
in Finland, a country without any neoliberal ideological offensive in the 1980s. The notion of neoliberalism 
will be avoided above notwithstanding the arguments for considering new macroeconomics as a new 
ideological basis for economic policy.     28 
that this will be possible in the medium term. It is in any case bound to generate 
accelerating inflation. Fiscal policy may have long-run effects on production and 
employment (by its effect on interest rates) but monetary policy is neutral. The neutrality 
of money makes it unnecessary and even harmful to establish targets for the Central Bank 
in terms of employment and GDP. In this theoretical perspective the most important task 
of economic policy in the medium and long term is to control inflation expectations and 
create favourable conditions for investments, e.g. by maintaining stable inflation. 
Furthermore, structural reforms aimed at improving the functioning of labour and product 
markets are the only feasible way of maintaining very low rates of unemployment. The 
neo-Keynesian element in the new consensus guarantees a room for macroeconomic 
policy interventions. But the neo-Keynesians are not abandoning the assumption of 
rational behaviour or the recommendation of structural measures to make product and 
labour markets more flexible. 
 
There are some weaknesses and inconsistencies in the new neoclassical synthesis. The 
role of fiscal policy in stabilization policy is uncertain, especially in relation to fiscal 
rules. Moreover, the proposition that aggregate demand has no effect on GDP and 
employment levels in the medium can be questioned by reference to the Stockholm-
Wicksellian theory of cumulative disequilibrium processes when nominal interest rates 
are rigid. This theory has in fact its parallels within new macroeconomics.  Negative 
demand shocks or restrictive fiscal policies may lead to higher real interest rates (because 
of possible reductions in expected inflation and sluggish nominal interest rates), and this 
would have durable negative effects on production and employment levels (Blanchard    29 
2011, 470-473). In transitional phases of economic policy making, situations in which the 
goal is to reduce inflation expectations, the new neoclassical synthesis may face critical 
changes in production and employment. For example, the restrictive fiscal policy of the 
Swedish social democrats in the mid-1990s was indeed a risky venture from a medium 
(and long) term perspective. What is more, restrictive monetary policy measures to fight 
inflation may reduce employment and production in the medium and long term if people 
are not fully rational. The trade-off between inflation and unemployment (the Phillips 
curve) seems to exist in e.g. the United States and Sweden at low rates of inflation (see 
Akerlof et al. 2000, Lundborg and Sacklén 2006). Inflation targeting as the only medium-
term strategy can in fact be questioned with reference to the neo-Keynesian assumption 
of price and wage rigidities. Neo-Keynesian theories (and empirical studies) shed light on 
the possibility of long-run employment and production effects of demand shocks and 
economic policy when prices and wages are inflexible. Furthermore, the obvious goal 
conflict in economic policy between output stabilization and inflation in the case of 
negative supply shocks makes it reasonable to argue for the coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policy. A social welfare function weighting inflation against unemployment should 
arguably be defined by the political system, not by the Central Bank (see the Bent 
Hansen-Jan Tinbergen goal-mean analysis).  
 
The new macroeconomic ideas were adopted by some leading Swedish politicians and 
their experts already in the early 1980s. The Budget Bills of the social democratic 
government emphasized the need to reduce inflation expectations in the Swedish 
economy (Erixon 2010, 690, 710, n 18). The Ministry of Finance primarily referred to    30 
price and wage expectations in Swedish product and labour markets. Leading social 
democrats and their economic advisors were particularly influenced by a report from 
some Swedish economists in the mid-1980s arguing for norms in economic policy. These 
economists emphasized the negative experiences of Swedish “accommodation policies” 
and the need for measures to reduce inflation expectations by strengthening confidence in 
fixed exchange rates (Tson Söderström et al. 1985). By reference to the Productivity 
Commission 1989-1991 the “norm economists” also assumed that devaluations (and 
reductions in payroll taxes) would hamper economic growth (Tson Söderström et al. 
1991, 13-14, 49-53). The Productivity Commission had argued for stronger 
transformation pressure to overcome Sweden’s productivity growth lag. The 
recommendations by the norm economists became an important guideline for the centre-
right government along its “One Way” (see Wibble 1992). 
 
The inflation target established in 1993 demonstrated that Swedish economic policy was 
still governed by norm thinking after the abandoning of fixed exchange-rates as an 
anchor. Moreover, the Budget Bills under the social democratic government referred 
explicitly in the mid-1990s to the NAIRU and the equilibrium rate of unemployment and 
to the necessity of making structural reforms in the labour market. The Ministry of 
Finance agreed with leading academic economists that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment was above the actual rate at the end of the 1980s and also increasing 
during this decade because of higher replacement ratios and less wage coordination. The 
ministry also shared the OECD view that the equilibrium rate of unemployment had 
increased (for unclear reasons) to at least 4-5 per cent during the first half of the 1990s    31 
(Ministry of Finance, Revised Budget Bill 1995, appendix 1.1, 91, Budget Bill 1996, 
appendix 1, 38). However, the reduction in the replacement rate in the unemployment 
insurance system in the mid-1990s was primarily a part of the budget consolidation 
policy (Ministry of Finance, Revised Budget Bill 1995, 31). 
 
In the mid-1990s, the social democratic government emphasized like the Central Bank 
the need for measures aimed at reducing inflation expectations. The Budget Bills, the so-
called convergence program (Ministry of Finance 1995) and the government’s proposal 
for growth policy in 1995 (Government Proposition 1995/96, 25) assumed in line with 
new macroeconomics that a restrictive fiscal policy would lead to lower inflation 
expectations and also to higher economic growth and permanently higher employment 
levels. 
 
The notion of time-inconsistent political decisions (for example, politicians are willing 
and able temporary to reduce unemployment by demand management if economic agents 
are not fully informed) was pivotal in the new neoclassical consensus. The notion was 
also central in the new political economy, the second theoretical pillar of the new 
economic policy in e.g. Sweden in the 1990s. According to the political business-cycle 
theory politicians pursue an expansionary economic policy (and postpone measures to 
fight inflation) ahead of an election, hoping for re-election. In the (new) partisan theory 
politicians falsely believe that they can make trade-offs between inflation and 
unemployment (see the theory of rational expectations). Swedish macroeconomists 
referred to these theories when arguing for central-bank autonomy and also for fiscal    32 
rules. The new political economy was the theoretical base for the public committee 
working out the proposal of an independent Central Bank with price stability as the 
superior objective (see SOU 1993:20, appendix 2). 
 
The third theoretical pillar of the new economic-policy regime in Sweden was the wage 
bargaining, trade union and efficiency-wage theories of modern macroeconomics 
determining the equilibrium rate of unemployment. These theories agree that market 
forces are peripheral or only indirectly of importance for the equilibrium wage rate. On 
the other hand, by pointing to shifts in the “wage-setting” function, bargaining and trade-
union theories legitimate incomes policy solutions such as the Industrial Agreement. 
Furthermore, these theories support the conclusion that equilibrium unemployment can 
be reduced by cuts in unemployment benefits. If, alternatively, stock-flow matching 
models (with heterogeneous workers and jobs) had been more influential in Swedish 
economics in the 1990s and 2000s, collective wage agreements and incomes policy 
would have played a more subordinate role in the new economic-policy regime, while 
policy measures aimed at increasing labour market flexibility would have been more 
important. Some economists have formulated search models showing that unemployment 
would be reduced by lower replacement ratios, but this conclusion is based on a large 
number of restrictive assumptions (cf. Pissarides 1986). 
 
The “age of economism” culminated under the present centre-right coalition government. 
The new policy orientation of the leading party in the coalition, Moderata 
Samlingspartiet, was based on all theoretical pillars attributed to the new approach to    33 
economic policy above. For example, the party emphasized the crucial role of central 
trade unions in incomes policy, a clear break with the “One Way” in the early 1990s. The 
Minister of Finance Anders Borg, were strongly influenced by the neoclassical synthesis 
and the other two pillars of modern macroeconomics. His belief was probably 
strengthened by empirical studies showing that high labour taxes and high unemployment 




Did the colour of the government matter? 
 
The arguments by “the new moderates” (see Moderata Samlingspartiet) in the mid-2000s 
for collective wage agreements, job security laws, labour market policies (primarily 
employment subsidies and matching services), tax-financed welfare programs and full 
employment indicate that there was still an ideological hegemony for social democracy in 
Sweden. Some central features of the party’s successful new strategy were compatible 
with their old strategy along the “One Way”, especially the reductions in income taxes, 
but the arguments differed. The new moderates did not argue for tax cuts directly in terms 
of economic growth. Instead, by taking over the concept “the work line” from the social 
democrats they argued for effective measures aimed at increasing the employment rate.  
But the social democrats had obviously lost its political hegemony in the 1990s and 
2000s. 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Nickell et al. (2005). It was not risk free to base an economic-policy strategy on cross-country 
econometric studies from the 1990s and early 2000s. The results from these studies were later questioned 
on methodological grounds. At the same time, there were restrictions on the centre-right support for 
economism – the government largely abandoned those property taxes that are almost unanimously 
supported by economists.     34 
 
The loss of political hegemony of the social democrats in the 1990s and 2000s seems not 
to have been salient for the change in Swedish economic policy. The financial markets 
had been deregulated under social democratic governments in the 1980s. In 1993, the 
social democrats opposed the non-socialist radicalization of their former decision to 
permit private employment services. Centre-right parties predominantly ruled Sweden 
and Finland in the first half of the 1990s, a period with radical deregulation of the goods 
and service sectors. But the Swedish deregulation of product markets had been started by 
the social democrats in the early 1990s, they had also executed or accepted the bulk of 
the non-socialist proposals in the 1991-1994 period. Product and financial markets had 
also been deregulated in Norway from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, with the social 
democrats in office. The pragmatic acceptance of such policies by the Nordic social 
democrats (and the centre-right coalition parties in Finland) indicates that ideology was 
not decisive for the deregulation of financial and product markets in the Nordic countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s. But the enthusiastic support for deregulation (including 
privatization) by Moderata Samlingspartiet (the leading non-socialist party) on 
ideological grounds influenced the orientation and perhaps also the scope of product-
market deregulations in Sweden in the 1990s. 
 
In Sweden, the non-socialist parties (including the Green Party) seemed more prone to 
make exceptions from the legislation on job security than the social democrats. But 
exceptions were also made by a social democratic government (1996). The hypothesis 
that centre-right parties are more willing to give up job security than the social democrats    35 
is refuted by the new policy of Moderata Samlingspartiet, the dominating party in the 
present centre-right coalition. Moreover, in the mid-1990s, unemployment benefits were 
reduced by a social democratic government.
9 
 
Inflation targeting and the consolidation of an independent Central Bank under a non-
socialist government were immediately accepted by the social democrats. What is more, a 
social democratic government embarked on a very restrictive fiscal policy, despite high 
unemployment, in the mid-1990s. The budget consolidation was supported in Parliament 
first by the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) and then by the Centre Party (Centerpartiet). And 
it was a social democratic government that imposed various restrictions on fiscal policy, 
restrictions that were only opposed by the Left Party. The social democrats 
simultaneously declared a war against neo-liberalism. But the party have accepted, and 
even initiated, the introduction of the new economic-policy regime.  
 
Thus, deregulation and especially the new macroeconomic policy in Sweden in the 1990s 
and 2000s, can hardly explained by the shift in the political power balance in favour of 
parties to the right of the social democrats.
10 Leading social democrats also supported the 
idea that the public sector became too large in the 1980s. The share of public expenditure 
and taxes in GDP was reduced by social democratic governments in the 1990s and 2000s. 
There ambition was to provide more room for private provisions of child care, elderly 
                                                 
9 However the social democrats partly restored the former unemployment benefit ratios in 1998 when the 
public budget was in balance again (and an election was approaching) and they opposed the exceptions to 
the Job Security Act decided by Parliament in 2001. 
10 There was also a strong consensus in Swedish politics in the 1990s about the need for a new 
supplementary pension system. The new system introduced in 1998 was a political compromise between all 
parties in Parliament excluding only the Left Party.    36 
care, education and health. But the social democratic resistance to the tax reductions and 
privatization of state-owned companies suggested by the current centre-right government 
shows that the size of the public sector and deregulation remains a major cleavage line in 
Swedish politics. 
 
While in the 1930s and the early postwar period, the social democrats had formulated 
alternatives to established economic ideas and policies, they failed to do so in the 1990s 
and 2000s. In opposition 1991-1994 the social democrats had first advocated 
expansionary fiscal policy measures in order to fight unemployment. But they abandoned 
this “orthodox” Keynesian policy immediately before the 1994 election. The main 
independent contribution to economic policy by Swedish social democracy in the 1990s 
and 2000s was the strong priority to higher education in the mid-1990s and the launching 
of the so-called Knowledge Lift (Kunskapslyftet) 1997-2002, an extensive program 
providing education at the upper secondary school level to people with primary education 
only. The Knowledge Lift involved 10 per cent of the labour force during the first four 
years. However, with the exception for these measures in the boarder land between 
education and economic policy, Swedish social democracy was an assimilator rather than 





                                                 
11 The newly appointed Prime Minister Göran Persson formulated in 1996 a green political vision, aiming 
to combining high economic growth with demanding environmental standards. This ideological renewal by 
the social democrats had, however, no significant effect on Swedish economic policy, including industrial 
policy, in the following years.    37 
From power groups to vested interests 
 
One reason for the social democratic loss of initiative in Swedish economic policy was 
the gradual marginalization of LO, the confederation of blue-collar workers. LO had had 
an exceptional impact on Swedish economic policy under social democratic governments 
in the postwar period until the mid-1970s (Erixon 2010, 684-685). This influence 
weakened in the 1970s and 1980s and had disappeared in the 1990s. Unlike earlier, 
decisions on deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and the tax reform 1990-1991 
were not been based on consultations between the LO and social democratic leadership.
12 
LO was critical but could not prevent deregulation (including financial markets 
deregulation in the 1980s), exceptions from the Job Security Act or changes in the social 
insurance system (such as reductions in the unemployment benefits).
13 And LO was not 
the initiator of the new macroeconomic policy. LO economists had advocated flexible 
exchange rates since the late 1980s, but their position had no decisive influence on the 
Central Bank’s decision (sanctioned by the centre-right government) to float the SEK in 
November 1992. And at that time, LO did not recommend that flexible exchange rates 
should be combined with inflation targeting.  
 
The LO influence on economic policy certainly ceased when the golden age of the Social 
Democratic Party was over. But the loss of social democratic hegemony in politics only 
partially explains LO’s loss of influence on economic policy. In the mid-1990s, even a 
                                                 
12 Interview with the LO Chief Economist P.-O. Edin (Book 1997, 37). It should be added that LO neither 
had any influence on the social democratic “Third Way” policy in the 1980s. 
13 However, the pressure from LO is one of the reasons why the social democratic government in 1998 
raised the unemployment benefit ratio back to the ratio enacted just before the start of its budget 
consolidation policy.     38 
social democratic government would regard LO as one among several special interest 
groups and no longer as an important initiator and partner in economic policy. The new 
relation between the social democrats and LO in the 1990s was the result of political 
decisions and economic developments in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
LO’s radical proposal of wage earner funds financed by profit taxes in the mid-1970s 
became a political burden for the organization and also for the social democratic party in 
the subsequent decades. A watered-downed version of wage earner funds without the 
original ambition of changing power relations and ownership in the Swedish business 
sector was introduced in 1983. But these funds were quickly abolished by the centre-right 
government (in 1992). Furthermore, misplaced advice from LO contributed to Swedish 
overheating in the 1980s. Economic policy was at stake in the “war of roses” between the 
social democratic government and LO during the 1980s.
 14 LO opposed government plans 
to cool down the overheated Swedish economy by higher indirect taxes. The resulting 
failure to tighten fiscal policy sufficiently was a Pyrrhic victory for LO. In the 1990s the 
organization considered it a big mistake.  
 
Undoubtedly, the wage-earner fund radicalism and the “ultra-Keynesian” policy 
recommendations weakened LO’s influence on economic policy in the 1990s even under 
social democratic governments. At the same time, LO – together with member unions in 
the exposed sector - eventually tried to demonstrate “responsibility” by sanctioning 
compulsory incomes policy in 1990. This stirred up strong internal tensions within LO. 
                                                 
14 The growing skepticism regarding nuclear power among leading social democrats in the late 1970s and 
1980s was also a source of a split between the party and the LO unions organizing wage earners in the 
exposed sector.     39 
The proposal was primarily resisted by the trade unions in the public sector. LO unity had 
already been challenged by the devaluations and by the change from coordinated to 
industrial wage negotiations in 1983. Separately or in interactions these factors caused a 
development towards larger wage gaps (cf. Gustavsson 2008). In the 1990s and 2000s, 
industrial wage negotiations (including the Industrial Agreement) created tensions mainly 
between the LO trade unions inside and outside the manufacturing sector.  
 
Industrial wage negotiations (with some exceptions) from the mid-1980s reduced the role 
of LO in wage formation to that of an informal coordinator of blue-collar wage claims. 
From 1956 to 1983 LO was a central agent in coordinated wage negotiations between the 
central employer organization SAF and the blue-collar unions. In the mid-1990s, the 
organization failed to become a central actor in a reconstructed system of coordinated 
wage bargaining focusing on incomes policy (Edin Group 1995). Instead, the parties to 
the Industrial Agreement became the main actors when incomes policy was incorporated 
in the new economic-policy regime (see the Industrial Agreement). The change from 
coordinated to industrial wage agreements reduced LO’s influence on incomes policy but 
also on economic policy in general.
15 What is more, the increasing influence of economic 
experts since the 1980s (see next section) was largely at the expense of LO. 
 
Thus, non-socialist governments, controversial LO positions, internal conflicts (e.g. 
through the social democratic “Third Way” policy in the 1980s), decentralized wage 
                                                 
15 In 2008-2009, LO also failed in its ambition to reach an agreement on labour relations – similar to the 
1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement – with The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv, 
formerly SAF) and the cartel of white-collar unions (PTK). The negotiations broke down because LO and 
Svenskt Näringsliv were too divided on the issue of job security.    40 
bargaining and the power of experts were factors behind the declining LO influence over 
Swedish economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Another explanation of LO’s 
peripheral role in Swedish economic policy-making through these decades was the higher 
unemployment, which reduced the general strength of labour. In addition, the global shift 
of labour demand in favour of skilled labour and private service sector jobs was 
unfavourable to LO. Wage earners in ICT industries and dynamic private service sectors 
were largely organized by trade unions outside LO, they were also generally less 
organized. In the 1990s and 2000s, there was a substantial decrease in union density in 
Sweden although from a high level in an international perspective. The unionized 
workers’ share of employees shrank steadily from 83 per cent 1990 to 71 per cent 2008, 
remaining stable 2008-2010 despite a deep recession (Kjellberg 2010). The reduction in 
union density accelerated during the present centre-right coalition (from 77 in 2006 to 73 
per cent in 2007) because of higher individual fees in the unemployment benefit system, 
especially for workers in industries with a high risk of unemployment (manufacturing), 
and the elimination of tax deductions for membership in trade unions and unemployment 
insurance funds.  
 
The marginalization of LO in the 1990s and 2000s had actually no parallels in other 
Scandinavian countries. Norwegian LO actually strengthened its position through these 
decades; Norway is the only Western country where the influence of a central blue-collar 
union organization on economic policy today can be compared to that in Sweden in the 
early postwar period. The decentralization of wage negotiations to industrial and local 
levels, and increasing inclination to distribution of centrally determined wage increases at    41 
the local level, was probably more accentuated in Sweden than in the other Nordic 
countries in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, Denmark had experienced increasing 
unemployment already in the 1970s and actually a declining rate in the 1990s. Moreover, 
Norwegian unemployment never approached the high Swedish rate in the 1990s. 
 
Facing the decline of its strength, LO gradually turned to support the new economic-
policy regime. In the early postwar period, LO had formulated a successful alternative 
economic policy model (the Rehn-Meidner model). Now, the organization failed to come 
up with alternatives. Despite protests particularly from public sector member unions and 
rank-and-file, LO did not oppose the very restrictive fiscal policy by the social democrats 
in the mid-1990s. The organization gradually accepted the independence of the Central 
Bank, the rules for fiscal and monetary policy and the underlying new macroeconomic 
theories (LO 2008). LO criticized the Central Bank for pursuing a too restrictive 
monetary policy during the first half of the 2000s, but only in relation to the inflation 
target. Faced with a fait accompli, LO also in due course approved the deregulation of the 
Swedish economy with the exception of the changes in the social insurance system under 




But the weaker influence of LO on Swedish economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s was 
not matched by a growing influence of capital interests. The Confederation of Swedish 
                                                 
16 In fact, the LO economists accepted the neo-Keynesian theory that recessions are caused by wage 
rigidities (LO 2008). At the same time they advocated the structural policy of the Rehn-Meidner model. 
Recently, the LO chief economist has emphasized the model even more strongly, urging the social 
democrats to use an up-dated version (see Westerlund 2011).     42 
Enterprise, Svenskt Näringsliv, was not a central actor when Sweden introduced flexible 
exchange rates, central bank independence or fiscal and monetary targets.
17 With the 
possible exception for the campaign for Swedish membership in the EU and EMU, 
Svenskt Näringsliv and the large multinational companies kept a low profile in the 
discussions about economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Managers and owners of the 
companies did express their negative view of the economic policy during the social 
democratic party’s first term in office (1994-1998). But at the end of the period they 
focused on the uncertain future of nuclear power, the tax collection system, the financing 
of the social security scheme and certain peripheral taxes (see värnskatten below). They 
were not concerned with crucial labour relations or with the benefits in the social 
insurance system or other central issues in fiscal policy (see Gyll et al. 1997).  
 
Immediately after the election to Parliament 1998 and the EMU referendum 2003, the 
social democratic government invited the central trade union organizations and Svenskt 
Näringsliv, primarily represented by the large companies, to discuss economic growth. 
The origins of these “growth talks” between 1999 and 2004 were the complaints by the 
companies that the capital and wealth taxes and absentee rates among wage earners were 
too high. These meetings were cancelled in Spring 2004 as Svenskt Näringsliv concluded 
that the discussions had not been constructive.
18 Thus, in the 1990s and 2000s, there were 
no revival of the “Harpsund meetings” (Harpsund is the representation residence for the 
Swedish Prime Minister), the corporative arrangements in the 1950s and the 1960s that 
                                                 
17 The Director General of Svenskt Näringsliv has recently expressed a negative attitude towards the fiscal 
rules (Bäckström 2011).  
18 See e.g. the interview with Jakob Wallenberg in Currents Magazine (2004).    43 
gave representatives of big business the opportunity to express their opinion about social 
democratic policies. 
 
The weak impact of Svenskt Näringsliv and the large multinational companies on 
Swedish economic policy was largely the result of a “silent agreement”. The companies 
and their representatives endorsed the termination of wage-earner funds, the 
deregulations of product and labour markets and the reduction of taxes on labour incomes 
and companies (by the 1990-1991 tax reform) and on capital incomes and wealth (by the 
centre-right governments in the early 1990s and in the 2000s). In the early 1990s, 
Sweden’s corporate income tax rate was one of the lowest in the OECD.
19 Furthermore, 
Swedish export companies benefitted from reductions in payroll taxes during the 
currency crisis in November 1992 and the weakening of the SEK under flexible exchange 
rates, especially during the first half of the 1990s. Finally, the success of Swedish export 
industries after the deep economic crisis in the early 1990s eased the pressure on Swedish 
governments to adjust economic policy to the interests of capital and the demands by the 
business sector for policy favours. 
 
But such a silent agreement is not the whole explanation of the weaker influence by 
capital interests on economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Svenskt Näringsliv had 
initiated coordinated wage agreements in the mid-1950s. In the 1990s and 2000s, the 
organization aimed to abandon central wage agreements completely in favour of 
negotiations at the company level, but failed to do so. Furthermore, economic policy in 
                                                 
19 OECD database, Corporate and Capital Income Taxes. In 2010, Sweden was in a group, together with the 
other Nordic countries, with medium profit taxes.    44 
the 1990s and 2000s was not fully in line with the general interests of capital or the 
interests of large multinational companies. In the previous decades, established industries 
and companies in the exposed sector had been patronized by beneficial tax rules, 
devaluations, grants to industries in crisis and regional subsidies (primarily benefiting the 
automobile companies in the 1980s). In contrast, the large Swedish companies were not 
unambiguously favoured by the 1990-1991 tax reform. The old profit tax system included 
ample room for tax allowances benefiting the large capital-intensive companies in 
particular. Furthermore, Svenskt Näringsliv and its member companies were not able, 
even under centre-right governments, to fully abandon the job security laws from the 
1970s. Nor could they prevent the social democratic government from reintroducing 
wealth taxes and implement a specific tax on higher labour incomes (värnskatten) in the 
mid-1990s, and they were unable to persuade the centre-right government to abolish this 
tax in the 2000s. Moreover, Svenskt Näringsliv and the majority of the large companies 
did not succeed in making Sweden a member of the EMU. (Some managers and owners, 
particularly in raw materials industries, were opposed to Swedish EMU membership.) A 
referendum in 2003 clearly rejected a proposal of EMU membership that had the support 
of the social democratic leadership.  
 
The political defeats of Svenskt Näringsliv in the 1990s and 2000s largely reflected that 
the organization and its leading companies were regarded by the governments as one 
among several other special interest groups. The social democratic government had a 
rather cool attitude to the demands by the large companies at the “growth talks” 1999-
2004 and did not refrain from criticizing the generous severance pay and bonus programs    45 
for CEOs. During the years of “Harpsund democracy” the social democrats’ view of big 
business had been less critical and more respectful. Even the non-socialist parties began 
to treat Svenskt Näringsliv and its influential large companies as special interest groups 
rather than as allies in the struggle against socialism. The centre-right government in the 
2000s treated the claims by Svenskt Näringsliv (and the large multinational companies) as 
similar to LO claims. On several occasions during the financial crisis, the Minister of 
Finance Anders Borg criticized the business sector (especially the banks) for paying too 
high CEO bonuses. In turn, this popular criticism contributed to the marginalization of 
Svenskt Näringsliv and its leading companies in the Swedish economic-policy discourse. 
Svenskt Näringsliv’s temporary return to Swedish corporatism in the early 2000s, when 
the organization participated in meetings about growth with the social democratic 
government, reflected a fear among the leaders that the organization had been reduced to 
a narrow interest group among many others. However, the marginalization of Svenskt 
Näringsliv was less obvious and dramatic than that of LO in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
New economic theories challenging corporatism contributed to the marginalization of 
labour but also of capital in the economic policy-making process. Modern 
macroeconomics recommends neutral expert decisions and departure from national 
planning, thereby excluding any participation of labour market organizations in the 
formation of economic policy. However, “voluntary” incomes policy survived the 
transformation into a new economic policy regime in Sweden and the other Nordic 
countries.  
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The weaker link between capital interests and economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s is 
also connected to some political-institutional and economic-structural factors. The change 
to flexible exchange rates made it harder for Svenskt Näringsliv and its members to push 
for measures improving the global competitiveness of the Swedish companies. What is 
more, the industrial agreements had weakened the role of Svenskt Näringsliv, despite the 
fact that the organization was more successful than LO in coordinating the members 
bargaining strategies and in solving (or displacing) internal conflicts. The professionalism 
of economic policy was another challenge to the central labour-market organizations, 
including Svenskt Näringsliv, in the 1990s and 2000s (see next section). But the 
marginalization of Svenskt Näringsliv in economic policy making was reinforced by its 
own decision to abandon corporatism. 
 
Svenskt Näringsliv refrained in the early 1990s from participation in almost all the public 
and semi-public arrangements (including the National Labour Market Board) that were 
essential parts of the Swedish corporative model. The organization felt that only LO 
would gain by corporatism. Participation in the growth talks with the social democratic 
government at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s was most likely only a temporary 
departure from Svenskt Näringsliv’s rejection of corporatism. The new Director General 
of Svenskt Näringsliv in 2005, Urban Bäckström (formerly the Governor of the Central 
Bank), openly declared that the era of meetings with the government was over. The 
organization’s withdrawal from corporatist institutions in the 1990s and 2000s certainly 
implied (as the lack of any parallels to the Harpsund meetings) a weaker direct influence 
of employer interests on Swedish economic policy.    47 
 
Less intense contacts between the business sector and the governments in Sweden in the 
1990s and 2000s is also explained by the strong increase in foreign ownership. Such 
ownership is much more common in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries.
20 In fact, 
in the 1990s and 2000s, some of the large Swedish multinational companies were taken 
over by foreign companies, financial institutions and individuals. The largest companies 
in the pharmaceuticals and raw materials industries in Sweden are controlled today by 
foreign owners (by Anglo-American and Austrian or Finnish owners respectively). In 
fact, among the 20 largest exporters from Sweden in 2009-2010 (see Largest Companies, 
2011) only eight were controlled by Swedish owners.  
 
However, the argument that increasing foreign ownership in the 1990s and 2000s 
weakened the influence of capital interests on Swedish economic policy should not be 
exaggerated. With the exception for the automobile companies, SAAB and Volvo, and 
the producers of trucks and buses, the Volvo Group and Scania, the large multinational 
companies in engineering (and the two largest steel companies Sandvik and SSAB) are 
still in the hands of the Wallenberg group or Handelsbanken. Thus, even in the 1990s and 
2000s, there were good opportunities for close contacts between leading politicians and 
representatives for the Swedish business sector.
21 The reduced involvement of Svenskt 
                                                 
20 There was a strong increase in the foreign companies’ share of total employment in Sweden in the 1990s 
and 2000s. In the late 2000s, Sweden was in the group of OECD countries with the highest employment 
share for foreign-owned companies, while the other Nordic countries were in the group with the lowest 
share for these companies (Västsvenska Industri- och Handelskammaren 2008, Figure 1 and 2). 
21 Mainly through its investment company Investor, the Wallenberg family is still the dominating owner of 
Ericsson, ABB (an electrical company established trough a merger between the Wallenberg-controlled 
Swedish company ASEA and the Swiss company Brown Boveri in 1988), SKF, Electrolux, Atlas Copco 
and SAAB (producer of aeroplanes). Through its investment company Industrivärden, Handelsbanken is 
the largest owner of the two steel companies SSAB and Sandvik and the second largest owner of Ericsson    48 
Näringsliv and business interests generally in the policy-making process largely reflected 
a silent agreement (e.g. through a strong recovery for the export industries), a new 
strategy (away from corporatism), and, as in the LO case, the proliferation of new (anti-
corporatist) economic theories, the decentralization of wage bargaining and the 
professionalism of Swedish economic policy.  
 
The strategic role of professional economists 
 
The introduction of a new economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 1990s is hard to 
explain without reference to new economic doctrines. At the same time, the strong 
position of professional economists, especially high civil servants in the Ministry of 
Finance (some of them politically appointed), was a condition for the breakthrough of the 
new economic ideas. The group of influential professional economists also includes top 
officials in the Central Bank, primarily the six decision makers at the Executive Board 
elected for five or six years in accordance with the new legislation in the late 1990s. 
Furthermore economic experts at the National Institute of Economic Research 
(Konjunkturinstitutet), the commercial banks, and also in the OECD, IMF and World 
Bank belong to “an expert culture” of importance for the orientation of Swedish 
economic policy. These economists are not directly involved in the formation of 
economic policy, but their opinions and recommendations are often of crucial 
importance. At times, they appear to serve as direct guiding principles for the policy 
makers and their “core” experts.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Volvo Group. Handelsbanken is one of the four leading commercial banks in Sweden, while one of 
the other banks (SEB) is controlled by the Wallenberg family.    49 
 
There is evidence that the influence of professional economists on economic policy 
increased in Sweden during the 1980s, particularly at the expense of LO and ministries 
other than the Ministry of Finance. The 1980 Medium Term Survey, developed by the 
Ministry of Finance under a non-socialist government, was the first official document 
criticizing public sector growth and Keynesian domestic-demand management. The 
survey laid the ground for the reorientation of Swedish economic policy: measures to 
increase the cost competitiveness of Swedish companies would be given priority and the 
exposed sector would be stimulated at the expense of the public sector. However, already 
during the second half of the 1970s, there had been political concern for the profit crisis, 
loss of Swedish market shares and the emergence of a structural public deficit. This 
makes it hard to decide whether the retreat from Keynesian stimulation of domestic 
demand during the recession in the early 1980s was expert or political led.  
 
The role of experts was more obvious during the social democratic government 1982-
1991. The 1982 devaluation along the social democratic “Third Way” was not the only 
option. The structural public deficit (and current-account deficit) could have been met by 
restrictive fiscal policy alone. Ahead of the 1982 election there were also plans within the 
party to fight post-OPEC II unemployment by means of Keynesian domestic-demand 
stimuli (public infra-structural investments, housing programs, etc.). During this social 
democratic government, the efforts to enlarge the exposed sector through a strong 
devaluation of the SEK and predominantly restrictive (though countercyclical) fiscal 
policy were planned by a small number of economic experts with political agendas. The    50 
same experts recommended that the SEK be linked to the German Mark after the 1982 
devaluation (Bergström 1987, 126-128, 193-201, Feldt 1991, 60, Elmbrant 1993, ch. 9-
10, Lindvall 2004, 74-78). Furthermore, when the credit market was deregulated in 1985 
these experts sanctioned (together with the Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt) the 
decision. They even participated in the decision making process as representatives of the 
government in the Central Bank’s General Council. The proposal had been worked out by 
a small number of top officials in the Central Bank. In the late 1980s, a group of experts 
within the Ministry of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt and the leaders of the Central Bank 
initiated the abolition of the currency controls (Elmbrant 1993, 126-127, Lindvall 2004, 
78).  
 
There was no debate between the political parties or within the social democratic 
government ahead of the decisions to regulate financial markets. The involved experts 
and politicians considered deregulation as too technical, urgent and inevitable for general 
political discourse. However, during the second half of the 1980s, strong tensions 
evolved between the Ministry of Finance and other ministries. The heads and experts of 
these ministries held that Kjell-Olof Feldt and his advisors were orchestrating a neoliberal 
attack against the Swedish model. Feldt and his experts on the other hand blamed 
especially the Department of Social Affairs (and LO) for having obstructed necessary 
steps to cut public transfers and fight overheating. The absence of such conflicts within 
the social democratic governments in the 1990s and 2000s indicated that the Ministry of 
Finance had finally won the day. 
    51 
But the influence of experts on Swedish economic policy did not become unambiguously 
stronger in the 1990s and 2000s. It was not even obvious in this period that the changes in 
economic policy were driven by experts rather than by politicians. First, tensions within 
the centre-right government 1991-1994 actually reduced the power of the Ministry of 
Finance. In this period strategic decisions on economic policy were made at ministerial 
meetings or in the Prime Minister’s Office. Second, the Ministry of Finance regained its 
former position once the new social democratic government took office, but in that 
government, the flamboyant Minister of Finance Göran Persson had a strong influence on 
Swedish economic policy independently of the ministry’s top civil servants. In fact, the 
real power of the Minister of Finance declined when Persson became Prime Minister in 
1996. For example, Erik Åsbrink, who had succeeded Persson as a Minister of Finance, 
resigned in 1999 following a conflict with Persson.  
 
Third, it is difficult to assess whether economic policy was expert led or political led in 
the 1990s and 2000s because of an initially strong consensus between the political parties 
and also between the economic experts and politicians. This consensus was a result of the 
traumatic national experience of a deep recession and public budget crisis in the early 
1990s and of the gradual convergence in economic thinking and views of economic 
policy in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s, a small group of experts inspired by new 
macroeconomic ideas had pioneered a new approach to Swedish economic policy, an 
approach that was first generally accepted by social democratic and non-socialist 
politicians in the 1990s.  
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The strong 1990s consensus among politicians and their economic experts was 
particularly conspicuous in the case of the restrictive fiscal policy and the introduction of 
fiscal rules. In addition, the independent role of Göran Persson refutes the hypothesis that 
the underlying consensus ultimately reflected the opinion of professional economists. 
When arguing in the mid-1990s for a very restrictive fiscal policy Persson did not refer to 
the importance of reducing inflation expectations in accordance with the new consensus 
in macroeconomics. He merely argued for fiscal austerity from a cameralist (book 
accounting) viewpoint. Already as a Minister of Finance, Persson distanced himself more 
clearly from economists than both his followers and his predecessor Feldt.
22 In Persson’s 
cameralist perspective the emergence of a large public deficit and public debt was a 
sufficiently strong argument per se to conduct a very restrictive fiscal policy in the mid-
1990. Persson was even prepared to ignore recommendations by academic economists 
who suggested that most of the restrictive fiscal measures might be postponed until the 
crisis was over (SOU 1993:16, 188). Moreover, economic experts in the Ministry of 
Finance later declared that they had preferred a somewhat less restrictive fiscal policy 
than Persson. It seems also that Persson was the initiator of the fiscal rules although these 
were developed in close contact with his successor as a Minister of Finance (Åsbrink) 




                                                 
22 Persson’s view of the public budget crisis in Sweden during the 1990s is clearly represented by his 
device “Those who are in debt are not free” which was also the title of his book about the budget 
consolidation (Persson 1997). Persson’s book-accounting view of fiscal policy was in fact similar to that of 
Gunnar Sträng, the social democratic Minister of Finance from 1957 to 1976. 
23 Interview 14 July 2011 with Ingemar Hansson, the head of the Economic Department at the Ministry of 
Finance 1992-1999.    53 
With these caveats, we are inclined to conclude that experts increased their power over 
Swedish economic policy, and that they were also the main actors behind the changes in 
economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s. However, when analyzing the forces behind 
deregulation and central-bank autonomy, it is necessary to include some influential 
academic economists in the group of economic experts. 
 
First and foremost, the professionalism of Swedish economic policy was largely 
institutionalized in the 1990s. The most striking example is the development of an 
independent central bank. Monetary policy is determined today by the six experts on the 
bank’s Executive Board. According to the central bank reform 1998-1999 the General 
Board, formally appointed by Parliament, no longer has any direct control over Swedish 
monetary policy. Moreover, the position of the Ministry of Finance was strengthened by 
a budget reform in 1996. The commission that recommended the reform (in 1993) 
considered Sweden’s budget institutions as the second worst among 13 Western 
European countries in the early 1990s. Only Italy was worse. The budget reform 
transformed these institutions – Sweden now has a top-down public budget process where 
aggregate decisions in Parliament on the central government budget are made prior to the 
decisions on the individual parts (Wehner 2007).    
 
Second, the claim that changes in economic policy-making during the latest decades have 
been policy led is weakened by the fact that the politicians accepted the development 
towards (more) central-bank independence and restrictions on fiscal policy. These 
reforms have certainly reduced their influence on economic policy. Such voluntary    54 
surrender of sovereignty by the political parties is hardly in accordance with those 
political economy theories that were fundamental for the policy reforms under review.
24 
Third, the decision in November 1992 to abandon fixed exchange rates and in January 
1993 to define a 2 per cent inflation target was made by a small group of top officials in 
the Central Bank together with politicians on the bank’s General Council. Their mandate 
was from Parliament rather than from the government.
25  
 
Fourth, as experts in public committees, leading academic economists subscribing to new 
theories of rational expectations and selfish or myopic political behavior worked out the 
proposals for an independent central bank guided by an inflation target (see SOU 1993: 
20, appendix 2). Furthermore, due to the strong consensus between the social democrats 
and the non-socialist parties as well as between politicians and economists, experts had 
ample opportunity to make independent proposals in public committees on deregulation 
of product markets and changes in the tax system (1990-1991). For example, a small 
group of academic economists (and the Director General of Konjunkturinstitutet) were 
central actors when the Swedish energy market was deregulated in the mid-1990s 
(Högselius and Kaijser 2007, 79). Furthermore, as members of the Executive Board 
academic economists have a strong influence on the practical execution of the Central 
Bank’s monetary policy.   
 
                                                 
24 The political decisions that introduced restrictive fiscal rules and independent monetary institutions are 
more in line with the psychological theories about self-disciplinary measures at hyperbolic discounting (see 
Erixon 2009). 
25 At that time Erik Åsbrink was the social democratic chairman of the General Council within the Central 
Bank. Åsbrink was also one of the initiators of the social democratic economic policy (including the 
deregulation of the financial market and the tax reform) in the 1980 and the early 1990s.    55 
The use of leading economists as experts in public and parliamentary committees and as 
governmental advisors was not a new phenomenon in Sweden (see Lönnroth 2010). On 
the contrary, it had been typical for the country since the early 20
th century. But it seems 
that the power of economic experts was reinforced in the 1990s by the strong consensus 
among (leading) Swedish economists about new economic policy and the theory 
underpinning it. Had there been more diverging opinions in the economic profession 
about e.g. central bank independence, inflation targets and the need for a restrictive fiscal 
policy in the mid-1990s, this might have resulted in a more differentiated view on 
economic policy among representatives of the political parties and the central labour-
market organizations. The absence of an economic-policy discourse among academic 
economists in the 1990s and 2000s is also explained by their march back to the 
institutions, a general phenomenon in economics during the latest decades. More 
emphasis on publications in scientific journals has reduced the incentives of academic 
economists to participate in public committees and the economic-policy debate. 
 
A fifth argument in favour of the hypothesis of expert-led economic policy in Sweden in 
the 1990s and 2000s is the exceptionally strong position of the Ministry of Finance (and 
its budget department) and Anders Borg under the present centre-right government. The 
position of the Ministry and its head was strengthened by the apparent macroeconomic 
success of Sweden. Borg’s exceptional position in the government is based on his status 
as a mainstream economist rather than as a representative for the largest party in the 
coalition. Foreign experts’ appreciation of Swedish economic policy made it easier for    56 
Borg to meet the criticism from other ministries (especially of the changes in the social 
insurance system) and also from academic economists.
26  
 
In sum, there was next to no political debate on the introduction of a new economic-
policy regime in the 1990s. There was a profound consensus about necessary changes, 
not only between the political parties but also between the politicians and their economic 
experts. Accordingly, it is difficult to disentangle whether the transformation of the 
policy regime was led by experts or by politicians. We lean, however, towards the 
conclusion that Swedish economic policy was generally formed by economic experts in 
the 1990s and 2000s. This is particularly so if we extend this group of experts to include 
the Ministers of Finance who have been strongly wedded to their experts. We also 
maintain that some strategic changes in Swedish economic policy, mainly the 
deregulation of the product markets, the change to flexible exchange rates, the 
introduction of an explicit inflation target and the development (and content) of the 
proposal of central-bank independence, were expert led. This is particularly so if we 
include some leading academic economists (governed by the new economic ideas) in the 




In November 1994, an advisory referendum approved Swedish membership in the EU by 
52 per cent of the vote. When joining the union in January 1995 Sweden also ratified the 
                                                 
26 Academic economists criticized the fiscal policy by the non-socialist government for focusing too much 
on tax cuts and for having been too cautious during the Great Recession (Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 
2011, 65-66, 235).     57 
Maastricht Treaty from November 1991. Thus Sweden was formally obliged to later 
become a member of the EMU (the Economic and Monetary Union) and also to follow 
the convergence rules of low inflation, low interest rates, stable exchange rates and public 
budget deficits not exceeding 3 per cent of GDP and government debts not growing 
larger than 60 per cent of GDP. But Sweden’s adjustment to the EU had already started in 
the early 1990s through the EEA (the European Economic Area) Agreement, that entered 
into force in January 1994. The agreement implied that the countries should follow the 
Single European Act (signed in 1986) stipulating free movement in goods, capital, labour 
and services in the European Community from 31 December 1992. Already when they 
submitted the membership application in 1991, Swedish governments felt impelled to 
start adjustment in anticipation of membership. The centre-right government 1991-1994 
reduced VAT taxes to fit the tax profile of the EU countries. The government also 
argued, as the following social democratic government, in favour of contractionary fiscal 
policy measures with reference to the Maastricht convergence rules.  
 
It cannot be denied that EU adjustment was an important determinant of Sweden’s 
change of economic policy regime in the 1990s. It seems that the early 1990s 
deregulation wave was heavily influenced by the demands for EU convergence, 
especially the provisions in the Single European Act and the EU rules against restrictions 
on competition (see Lundqvist 2003). Yet, we shall maintain that the EU adjustment 
argument is less valid than our other arguments (the deep recession and financial crisis in 
the early 1990s, the negative experience of economic policy in the past, the growing 
power of experts, primarily at the expense of LO, and the new economic ideas). Swedish    58 
politicians and top officials used the EU integration argument in order to legitimate a 
change in economic policy (including a restrictive fiscal policy) that they considered as 
inevitable against the background of new theories, the public budget crisis and the 
negative experiences of economic policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Our claim that EU 
convergence was less salient for the new economic-policy regime is supported by the fact 
that also countries outside Western Europe deregulated and conducted an economic 
policy along the lines of the Maastricht convergence rules. What is more, the change to 
flexible exchange rates in Sweden challenged the principle of stable exchange rates in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The plans to return to fixed exchange rates (the ERM) was soon 
abandoned when it became clear that Sweden performed satisfactory under flexible 
exchange rates.  
 
Sweden’s budget consolidation, fiscal rules and apparently good macroeconomic 
performance explains why the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was marginal to the 
economic-policy debate and also to the fiscal-policy decision process in the late 1990s 
and the 2000s (see Ministry of Finance 1999). The Pact from 1997 (in force from July 
1998), institutionalizing the fiscal guidelines of the EMU convergence program, would 
commit all future EU members. The Pact’s impact was further weakened by Sweden’s 
rejection of EMU membership in the referendum in 2003. Sweden’s fiscal rules were in 
fact stricter than the Stability and Growth Pact in one respect - the Swedish rule required 
a public saving surplus over the business cycle. This was only a recommendation in the 
SGP. 
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In the 2000s, the EU commission regarded Sweden as an example to follow rather than as 
a country that had to converge to the union rules. The commission praised the mid-1990s 
restrictive fiscal policy. In the Lisbon strategy (2000) aimed at catching up with the 
United States in terms of GDP per capita levels, the commission and its experts saw 
Sweden (and also other Nordic countries) as a good example for other EU countries 
(Aghion et al. 2003). The commission emphasized Sweden’s macroeconomic stability, 
all-embracing educational system, high R&D expenditure, and flexible labour and 
product markets. The EU also recommended Sweden’s ALMP programs for other 
member countries, but referred even more to the Danish flexicurity model than to the 
Swedish one.  
 
While it seemed like a rule that other EU countries should adjust to Sweden, there was at 
least one exception. A verdict by the European Court in December 2007 declared that the 
blockade by the Swedish Construction Union of a Latvian company in the winter of 
2004-2005 violated the EU principle of free mobility of services. The Latvian company 
Laval had won a contract for a school reconstruction in a Swedish municipality 
(Vaxholm) by paying Latvian (collective) wages instead of minimum wages for 
construction workers according to Swedish central agreements. The blue-collar trade 
unions in Sweden, and also in Denmark, feared that the Laval verdict would lead to wage 
dumping. In fact, leading politicians in the current centre-right coalition had expressed 
related fears that the verdict could be a threat to the Swedish model. According to EU, 
temporary posted workers in other countries must be paid legislated minimum wages.    60 




SWEDEN IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT MODERATION 
 
The macroeconomic performance of Sweden 1998-2007 
 
The question is whether Sweden’s macroeconomic performance in the 1990s and 2000s 
is explained by the new economic-policy regime or by external and structural factors 
beyond the control of domestic decision makers. We find that by 1998, all the 
components of the new macroeconomic policy had been put in place, serving as a set of 
economic-policy routines. 1998 was also the year when the budget consolidation and the 
regulation wave (on the product market) were completed. We shall consider 2007 as the 
end year of the routine period. Since then, the new regime was tested under exceptional 
conditions and also combined with some extraordinary measures.  
 
1998-2007 was a period of low economic volatility in the EU and OECD countries. 
Although an era of “Great Moderation” (cf. Stock and Watson 2002) the period was not 
free from negative macroeconomic surprises. In the early 2000s, an international 
recession coincided with an ICT crash that hurt Sweden, given her specialization in ICT 
products. The Swedish ICT flag ship, Ericsson, was on the brink of bankruptcy in 2001. 
The company survived first after a reconstruction, in which its mobile-phone division    61 
was merged with that of the Japanese electronics company Sony.  Yet, like in other 
OECD countries, the early 2000s recession in Sweden was mild and short-lived even if 
the employment recovery was delayed (see the references to jobless growth). The smooth 
economic development in the OECD and EU areas in 1998-2007 was mainly due to 
unsynchronized business cycles in major countries (even within the Euro area) and the 
absence of large oil shocks (although oil prices were increasing). Furthermore, in the 
1998-2007 period, OECD inflation was low in the OECD also in comparison with the 
previous years in the 1990s (see Table 2* in Appendix 2). Lower inflation in many 
OECD countries mainly reflected high productivity growth and more imports from low-
cost countries. Moreover, despite the backlash in the early 2000s, OECD unemployment 
was generally lower in the 1998-2007 period than in the early 1990s. It was also 
decreasing at the end of the period. Finally, GDP growth was higher in the OECD 
countries (including the Euro countries) from 1998 to 2007 than earlier in the 1990s (with 
Germany as a major exception).  
 
Even with favourable external conditions for the new economic policy regime, e.g. the 
absence of strong international demand and supply shocks, it cannot be excluded that 
Sweden performed better than other countries in the period under review. Not 
surprisingly, business cycle fluctuations (the standard deviation of the output gap) was 
larger in small open countries like Sweden than in the large Euro countries (and the 
United Kingdom) from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. However, in the 1998-2007 
period, the volatility of the economy seems to have been larger in Sweden than in the 
other Nordic countries (especially Denmark) and also larger than in small open Western    62 
European countries on average (own estimates based on OECD 2011, Table 10, see also 
Cotis and Coppel 2005, Table 4).  The latter group includes here the Nordic countries as 
well as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. But Sweden had lower 
inflation (CPI) in the 1998-2007 period than the OECD and Euro countries on average, 
than the other Nordic countries and also than the other small open Western European 
countries on average. The average annual rate of inflation in Sweden, 1.2 per cent, was 
significantly below the rate for the group of small Western European countries (1.7 
percent). Among these countries only Switzerland had lower inflation than Sweden in the 
1998-2007 period. Sweden’s relative inflation was particularly low in the (1997)1998-
2000 and 2004-2006 periods. 
 
On the other hand, in the 1998-2007 period, the rate of unemployment in Sweden was the 
same as in total OECD (the average annual rate was 6.7 per cent) and in fact higher than 
in other Nordic countries, except Finland (see Table 1* in Appendix 2). Swedish 
unemployment was also higher than unemployment in the small open Western economies 
on average (5.4 per cent), and, for example, than in the United States (4.9 per cent). And 
at the end of the period under review the Finnish unemployment rate moved close to the 
Swedish rate. These comparisons are based on the standardized ILO measure used by the 
OECD and also by Swedish authorities since 2007. The measure classifies full-time 
students who are job seekers as unemployed, an inclusion that is probably unfavourable 
for Sweden. In any case, it is striking that Sweden, even after the crisis in the 1990s, no 
longer belonged to the group of OECD countries with the lowest rate of unemployment. 
Furthermore, in the 1998-2007 period, Sweden failed to return to the high labour force    63 
participation rates of the early 1990s. The rate began to increase again in 2005, but from 
1990 to 2006, no other OECD country with the exception of Turkey and Poland 
experienced a similar fall in the labour force participation rate (OECD 2005a and 2010, 
Table B). The strong increase in long-term sickness absence (more than two months) in 
1998-2002, especially among women, made a significant contribution to the decline in 
the Swedish labour force rate. 
 
The ambiguous stabilization-policy outcomes in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period justify 
a comparison between Sweden and other countries in terms of the Phillips curve, that is, 
the trade off between inflation and unemployment. The Phillips-curve comparisons below 
(Figures 1-3), are based on CPI, the ILO measure of standardized unemployment, and on 
an equal weighting of unemployment and inflation (annual data). Sweden had a better 
Phillips curve than the EMU countries on average (Figure 1) and also than Finland in the 
1998-2007 period. The country had a similar (negatively sloped) Phillip curve as the 
other Nordic countries less Finland and the small countries on the European continent. 
But it is striking that Sweden climbed down the Phillips curve to a larger extent than the 
other Nordic countries in the 1998-2007 period if Finland is excluded. Sweden’s move 
downward along a similar Phillips curve is also obvious in comparison with the small 
open Western European countries less Finland on average and with the United States (see 
Figures 2 and 3).  
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Figure 1: The trade off between inflation and 
























Source: OECD 2005b and 2011. 
Figure 2: The trade off between inflation and 
unemployment, Sweden and the small open 
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Figure 3: The trade off between inflation and 


























Source: OECD 2005b and 2011. 
 
Sweden’s macroeconomic performance in 1998-2007 improves if we also take account of 
the growth rate. Swedish GDP growth was 3.4 per cent per year on average (OECD 2011, 
Table 1). Among the small open Western European countries only Finland had a higher 
growth rate (3.7 per cent). For example, Sweden had higher GDP growth than the United 
States (3.0 per cent) and than the EMU countries on average (2.3 per cent). It must be 
noted, however, that comparisons based on GDP data from the mid-1990s and onwards 
give a favourable impression of Sweden and Finland. During the first half of the 1990s 
annual GDP growth (on average) in Sweden and Finland was among the lowest in the 
OECD area and even negative. 
 
In the 1995-2006 period Sweden experienced a “productivity miracle”. Among the 
OECD countries only South Korea and Ireland had higher (labour) productivity growth    66 
than Sweden’s total economy although Finland was rather close behind (see Table 3* in 
Appendix 2). Sweden’s growth in labour productivity (average annual growth in GDP per 
hour) was 2.6 per cent. The similar growth rate in the small open Western European 
countries on average (Ireland is excluded from this group) was 1.7 per cent and in the 
EMU countries on average 1.1 per cent. In such growth comparisons, Sweden may be at a 
disadvantage due to her large public sector. The productivity performance of Sweden 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was even more impressing in the business sector 
and especially in manufacturing. Furthermore, like Finland, Sweden experienced high 
labour productivity growth also during the first half of the 1990s. By combining high 
productivity growth with low GDP growth Sweden and Finland were outliers in the 
OECD area during this period. 
 
Thus, in the 1998-2007 period, Sweden was no longer the country of low unemployment 
and economic growth but rather the country of low inflation and high (productivity) 
growth in an international perspective. The macroeconomic performance of Sweden in 
the period with a new economic-policy regime was completely opposite to that in the 
1970s and 1980s.  
 
Was Swedish macroeconomic development caused by the new economic-policy routine? 
 
Relatively low inflation in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period is seemingly due to structural 
factors common to small open Western European countries, but also to the effects of a 
restrictive monetary policy. Like in other OECD countries that gave priority to price    67 
stability Swedish monetary policy was countercyclical by a “divine coincidence” in the 
1998-2007 period. Thus inflation pressure was alleviated in the recessions and aggravated 
in the recoveries (cf. Blanchard and Gali 2007, 44). But in the 1998-2007 period, Sweden 
had more low-inflation points than the EMU countries (on average) on their respective 
Phillips curves (Figure 1). And Sweden moved downwards along a similar Phillips curve 
to a larger degree than other European countries and also than major OECD countries 
outside Europe (Figures 2 and 3). By international standards, the Swedish Central Bank 
pursued a restrictive monetary policy in 1998-2007. First, the explicit inflation target 
made the struggle against inflation more ambitious in Sweden than in e.g. the United 
States. Second, the Swedish Central Bank pursued a rigorous monetary policy given its 
inflation target. With the exception of 2001-2002 and 2007 the Central Bank consistently 
undershot the 2 per cent target (with various inflation measures). In 1998-2000 and 2004-
2005 Swedish inflation even fell below the target’s lower limit of 1 per cent (see 
Giavazzi and Mishkin 2006, OECD 2011, Table 18). 
 
Fiscal policy was also countercyclical in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period, with the 
possible exception for the election year 2006. The social democrats ran an expansionary 
fiscal policy before the 2002 election. But this policy was legitimized on Keynesian 
grounds, as 2002 was a recession year.
27 Swedish fiscal policy was predominantly 
restrictive in the 1998-2007 period, accumulating a public budget surplus in line with the 
fiscal rules of the new economic-policy regime.  
 
                                                 
27 There were also tendencies towards a procyclical fiscal policy in 1999, reflecting political business-cycle 
behaviour (see the election in September 1998) and Prime Minister Persson’s cameral approach to fiscal 
policy.    68 
But fiscal policy was more restrictive on average in e.g. Denmark, Finland, Belgium and 
Switzerland than in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period.
28 There is no general evidence that 
fiscal rules (including the Stability and Growth Pact) were decisive for fiscal 
consolidation in the OECD countries in the 1998-2007 period. And, as already 
mentioned, fiscal rules seemed to have been endogenous, thus adopted by countries with 
a strong fiscal discipline. But more importantly, the contractionary fiscal policy in other 
countries is evidence that fiscal policy was not responsible for Sweden’s more 
accentuated slide down the Phillips curve compared to other small open Western 
European countries. Monetary policy was more salient than fiscal policy for the relatively 
low inflation in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period.  
 
Accordingly, monetary restraint was also a pivotal cause of Sweden’s high 
unemployment in an international perspective in the 1998-2007 period. Together with 
fiscal austerity, monetary policy also contributed to historically high unemployment in 
Sweden. But high Swedish unemployment from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was 
probably also due to asymmetric shocks in the labour market. Large immigration to 
Sweden resulted in higher unemployment given the wage structure, the flexibility of the 
labour market and the prevalence of discrimination and language difficulties. It also 
seems that the deep recession and the restrictive economic policy of the 1991-1997 
period had long-run effects on unemployment, particularly through hysteresis effects 
(Erixon 2008). In neo-Keynesian terms, Swedish economists emphasized that the 
negative demand shocks during the first half of the 1990s had long-run effect on Swedish 
                                                 
28 Estimates based on OECD 2011, Table 28. Fiscal policy was, however, less restrictive in Austria and the 
Netherlands than in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period.    69 
unemployment; job security and high unemployment benefits led to wage rigidities, 
despite the reforms of the 1990s (Holmlund 2009, 119). 
 
The fact that monetary policy, and also fiscal policy in many cases, was more restrictive 
in Sweden than in other OECD countries suggests that we must look for other 
explanations of the country’s relatively high GDP growth 1998-2007. Swedish GDP 
growth was mainly (net) export driven. This was related to foreign recoveries, the revival 
of the Swedish basic industries (producers of raw materials and investment goods) 
because of the East Asian (mainly Chinese) growth miracle and the weaker SEK 1996-
2001 (especially against the dollar). Sweden’s large surplus in the current account (and 
dramatic increase in the export share of GDP) in 1998-2007 supports the hypothesis that 
Swedish growth was export led, and that industries with low import propensities, mainly 
raw materials producers, functioned as a growth engine.
29 Sweden’s export and GDP 
recovery was also driven, disregarding the early 2000s, by the ICT sector, especially 
telecommunications (see below). Thus, explaining the relatively high production growth 
in Sweden 1998-2007, our emphasis must be on industry-structural factors or more 
precisely, on the simultaneous success of the traditional export industries and the ICT 
industries. Moreover the ICT sector explains the major share of the Swedish productivity 
miracle, and it was also an important determinant of the low inflation in Sweden in the 
1998-2007. It remains to scrutinize the central role of the telecom industries in the 
Swedish economy, as well as the importance of the deregulations in the first half of the 
1990s for the Swedish ICT wonder. 
                                                 
29 The National Institute of Economic Research has associated the weakening of the SEK and the Swedish 
current-account surplus since the mid-1990s with a higher domestic saving propensity, partly for 
demographic reasons (National Institute of Economic Research 2011, 73-76).    70 
 
 
The decisive role of the ICT sector 
 
The Swedish postwar accumulation model can no longer be associated with a hegemonic 
position for labour and the social democratic party (cf. Erixon 1997). Moreover, defining 
the Swedish growth engine in the 1990s and 2000s, we must emphasize the ICT sector 
and especially the telecom industries (including both products and services). In fact, the 
contribution by telecom industries to the (high) labour productivity growth in the 
Swedish business sector 1993-2005 was 30 per cent (Lundgren et al. 2007, 26-30). Tele-
products accounted for approximately 2/3 of labour productivity growth in Swedish 
manufacturing in the 1991-2001 period. This contribution follows from telecom 
industry’s larger share of employment in Swedish manufacturing and productivity 
increases within the industry itself (Lind 2003). The ICT sector also contributed to labour 
productivity growth in other sectors through the substitution of ICT inputs for labour 
(reflecting the rapid price decreases for ICT products) and the spread of ICT knowledge 
(leading to higher total factor productivity in sectors outside the ICT industries as well). 
All OECD countries with a specialization in ICT products and services experienced (with 
the possible exception for the United Kingdom) high productivity growth from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s. On the other hand, high productivity growth in Sweden and 
Finland during the first half of the 1990s reflected enforced rationalization and creative 
destruction, thus the elimination of low-productivity plants and firms during the deep 
recession. Analogously, the Swedish productivity miracle from the mid-1990s was the    71 
result of strong transformation pressure that is, fierce competition in high-tech industries, 




The Swedish tele-product sector is dominated by the multinational company Ericsson 
(founded in 1876). The company functioned as an organizational and technological hub 
both within the ICT sector and between the new and traditional industries in Sweden. In 
the early postwar period, Ericsson had, like the other large Swedish multinational 
companies, a strategic position in the Swedish economy, above all as a transmitter of 
foreign knowledge. Throughout the ICT revolution, Ericsson’s role as a transmitter and 
also producer of new knowledge became even more important in the Swedish economy. 
The company’s development of digital mobile telephones and communication systems in 
the first half of the 1990s showed that even though it was on the technological path of an 
established producer of tele-products, Ericsson was able to join the ICT revolution. 
Furthermore, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, there was a rapid and extensive 
diffusion of new knowledge from Ericsson and its networks (including suppliers) as well 
as its spin-offs to other sectors of the Swedish economy. Given Ericsson’s status as a 
producer of high technology products and transmitter of new knowledge in the 1990s and 
2000s, it is no longer easy to distinguish a leading group of “mature” industries and 
companies in Sweden with strong ties to domestic and the international capital markets, 
                                                 
30 It should be noted in addition that the economic crisis in the early 1990s fostered a strong transformation 
pressure in general in the Swedish business sector. The disciplinary effect of (higher) unemployment (see 
Karl Marx) is another plausible explanation for Sweden’s remarkable productivity performance from the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s.     72 
and thus with negative effects on the development of new firms in dynamic markets (cf. 
Erixon 1997). 
 
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000, the ICT sector and Ericsson in particular made a 
significant contribution not only to Sweden’s productivity growth but also, 
notwithstanding the sector’s high imports, to the country’s export-led economic 
development. Ericsson’s share of Swedish export increased steadily during the second 
half of the 1990s. In year 2000, this share was almost 20 per cent in current prices (see 
Table 1 below). Ericsson’s share of Swedish exports was even larger in constant prices 
reflecting the dramatic reduction in relative prices for ICT products. At the same time, the 
share of tele-products in Swedish export increased to 17 per cent in 2000. Ericsson’s 
share of Swedish exports decreased during the ICT crisis in the early 2000s. In the 2003-
2010 period the company’s share of Swedish exports was stabilized around 9 per cent. 
But Ericsson is still the largest export company in Sweden.  
 
Table 1. Export sales by Ericsson and the tele-product industry as a percentage share of total Swedish 
export, current prices, 1998-2010. 
Ericsson/total Swedish export 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
16.3  18.7  19.7  15.0  10.8  8.8  9.6  9.6   9.1  9.0  9.2   9.5  8.8 
 
 
Tele-products/total Swedish export 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
13.8  15.9  17.0  11.8  10.1  8.9  9.9  10.0  8.9  7.3  7.3  7.3  8.6 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden and Ericsson annual reports.  
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The extremely low inflation in Sweden in the 1998-2007 period is to a large extent a 
result of the Central Bank’s inflation target and its overambitious – relative to the target - 
fight against inflation. But the telecom industries also contributed to Sweden’s low rate of 
inflation. First, unexpectedly strong productivity increases emanated from the telecom 
sector. This is a major explanation of the Central Bank’s restrictive monetary policy in 
the 1998-2007 period, given its inflation target. Since the Central Bank underestimated 
the productivity shocks from the ICT sector, it also overestimated the risk of inflation 
(see Hüfner 2007, 11-12). In the 1995-2006 period, a positive relationship existed (with 
an information delay) between the ICT-led productivity increases and the deviations from 
the inflation target. Second, low wage increases in Sweden relative to productivity 1998-
2007 was basically a result of the combined effects of strong productivity increases 
(through new technological opportunities) and price competition in the ICT sector. The 
reduction in prices for tele-products on the world market worsened the terms-of-trade for 
countries specialized, like Sweden, in these products. Figure 4 shows Sweden’s terms-of-
trade with and without tele-products 1990-2009. The Swedish terms-of-trade deteriorated 
from the mid-1990s, but not if tele-products are excluded. Worsening terms-of-trade 
conditions have a dampening effect on firms’ profitability, thus reducing the room for 
wage increases. Negative terms-of-trade effects contributed (together with the weakening 
of the dollar from 2001) to the absence of a positive trend in profitability in Swedish 
manufacturing in the 1998-2007 period, despite the fact that this was mainly a recovery 
period (cf. Industrins Ekonomiska Råd 2011, diagram 4.6). 
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Figure 4. Sweden’s terms-of-trade, including and excluding teleproducts, 1990-2009. 























Source: Statistics Sweden and own estimates. 
 
International comparisons have shown that wage restraint, measured as the wage lag 
relative to productivity increases, increased more in Sweden than in other EU countries 
with the exception for Finland from 1991-1998 to 1999-2004 (Hüfner 2007, 11). Many 
economists refer to the successful outcome of the incomes-policy arrangements in the 
new economic-policy regime, primarily the Industrial Agreement. The possibility of 
wage moderation through successful Swedish incomes policy cannot be fully excluded 
(though the pace of overall wage increases was primarily endogenously determined by 
changes in labour-demand conditions in the period under review). But the hypothesis that 
Swedish wage restraint is explained by the country’s specialization in tele-products is    75 
supported by the developments in terms-of-trade and manufacturing profitability, as well 
as by the fact that also Finland, notwithstanding the differences in the wage negotiation 
system (see Vartiainen 2011), displayed a wage lag behind productivity similar to the 
Swedish one.   
 
Increasing production and use of ICT products is also decisive for increasing earnings 
dispersion in Sweden from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. In the 1998-2007 period, 
increasing wage differentials in Sweden and other countries specialized in ICT products 
(for example Finland, United Kingdom, South Korea and the United States) reflected 
wage increases in the higher income brackets that is, for skilled labour (cf. Gustavsson 
2007, Erixon 2008).  
 
But it would be possible to argue that deregulation was responsible for Sweden’s 
relatively low inflation, favourable Phillips curve (in comparison to the EMU countries) 
and the Swedish productivity miracle. Deregulation might have led to high productivity 
growth in Sweden by increasing the competitive pressure in the ICT sector, the size of 
this sector and the capacities of other industries to adopt the new technologies. But it is 
equally plausible that the ICT-led productivity boom in Sweden reflected successful 
technological paths, skills and industrial networks unrelated to the deregulation wave in 
the 1990s. This hypothesis is supported by the central role of Ericsson in the telecom 
industry (cf. Nokia’s position in Finland). Comparisons of ICT countries do not indicate 
that deregulation was a major explanation of Sweden’s high productivity growth (see for 
example the regulated South Korean economy). The argument that deregulations were    76 
responsible for Sweden’s high productivity growth 1995-2006 is supported by the fact 
that the increasing ICT share of total Swedish employment made a larger contribution to 
Swedish productivity growth than the productivity increases within the ICT sector itself 
in the 1991-2001 period (see Lind 2003, Table 3). However, it is difficult to estimate the 
direct relationship between deregulation and the productivity developments in, for 
example, Sweden (cf. Lundgren et al. 2007, 90-92). It is still an open question whether 
deregulation was a pivotal determinant of the Swedish productivity boom. 
 
We shall summarize the analysis of the importance of the new economic-policy regime 
for Sweden’s macroeconomic performance in the 1998-2007 period. Macroeconomic 
stability in Sweden resulted from the absence of strong symmetric demand and supply 
shocks in the OECD area. Sweden’s relatively high GDP growth is mainly explained by 
the country’s low GDP growth in the early 1990s and her favourable industrial 
composition in a period of strong recoveries abroad, especially in the East-Asian 
countries. It is thus not the result of a superior new economic-policy regime. Sweden’s 
relatively low inflation (and high unemployment) 1998-2007 was largely a result of the 
Central Bank inflation target, but also of overambitious anti-inflationary policy, as well 
as of ICT technological shocks that are difficult to measure. The remarkable productivity 
boost in the Swedish business sector is almost exclusively related to the tele-product 
sector. It is an open question whether deregulation was important for the Swedish 
productivity boom. It is not unlikely that the high productivity growth in Sweden from 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was a function of fundamental technological and    77 
organizational factors (as indicated by the notion of path dependence), not of the 
deregulations in the 1990s.  
 
 
SWEDEN DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
In the 2008-2011 period the new economic-policy regime in Sweden was seriously 
tested, first by a supply shock and then by a global financial crisis. The food and oil price 
shock in 2008 marked the end of a period with “divine coincidence” in Swedish monetary 
policy, a period without any serious conflict between the inflation target and the 
supplementary goal of stabilizing the real economy. To cool down overheating, the 
Central Bank in 2006 began to increase its repo rate (prime interest rate). In 2008, the 
Central Bank also decided to increase the repo rate by reference to international supply 
shocks. The bank even raised the repo rate five days before the fall of the Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. This decision was later seen as a mistake by those members 
of the Executive Board who supported the decision. The global financial crisis was 
already on its way. 
 
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis had no immediate negative effect on Sweden’s 
macroeconomic development. The Swedish banks (“the big four”) were not holders of 
the poisonous kinds of assets that had financed the U.S. housing boom. Unlike Danish 
banks in 2007-2008, Swedish banks were not hit by a bursting housing bubble. Neither 
commercial banks nor other financial institutes in Sweden suffered from serious credit    78 
losses during the Great Recession because of bankruptcies in the Swedish business sector 
(see Statistics Sweden 2010, Figure 1). The biggest threat to Swedish banks during the 
global financial crisis was their interests in the Baltic countries, as these were hit not just 
by an international recession, but also by a collapsing real-estate market and a 
domestically-generated recession following an exceptional boom.  
 
The Swedish Central Bank met the Great Recession by reductions in the repo rate (from 
October 2008 until July 2009) and by keeping the rate low and stable for a year (until 
July 2010). Furthermore, moving close to the liquidity trap of zero interest rates (0.25 per 
cent), the Central Bank took extraordinary measures to increase money supply. In 
addition, the government offered guarantees for medium-term loans to commercial banks 
and other financial institutions (from August 2008 to July 2011). But since there were 
restrictions on bonuses in this (voluntary) guarantee program, the number of participants 
was low. The centre-right coalition also introduced a program designed to stabilize the 
Swedish financial sector. The government established a Stability Fund. By contributing 
to this fund, financial institutions should help support financial actors in crisis.  
 
Sweden entered the Great Recession with large surpluses in the public budgets. This gave 
room to stimulate the economy by built-in stabilizers, as well as by expansionary fiscal 
policies. Already before the recession, the centre-right coalition had reduced income 
taxes by so-called job tax deductions, implying decreases in both marginal and average 
tax rates. These tax reductions were mainly based on the structural argument that 
measures that would increase work incentives were necessary. In fact, job tax deductions    79 
were the main component of the leading government party’s (Moderata Samlingspartiet) 
strategy to reduce unemployment and boost labour supply. Arguing for this strategy 
during the Great Recession, Minister of Finance Anders Borg and other representatives 
for the government also referred to the need for countercyclical Keynesian measures. 
However, according to OECD estimates, Swedish fiscal policy became more restrictive 
in 2008 and 2009. The political opposition and influential economists alike criticized this 
cautious fiscal policy and also the weak emphasis on labour market training during the 
Great Recession.  
 
The centre-right coalition in the late 2000s was not as willing as the centre-right coalition 
of the 1970s and the early 1980s to support companies in crisis. The automobile company 
SAAB has been threatened by bankruptcy since December 2009. The government offered 
loans to the automobile industry (5 billion SEK), credit guarantees at loans from the 
European Investment bank (20 billion SEK) and R&D subsidies (3 billion SEK). These 
supports were conditional and much smaller than the corresponding grants to Swedish 
companies in crises after OPEC I and II. 
 
Like other OECD countries, Sweden experienced a sharp decrease in GDP growth in the 
two last quarters of 2008 and in 2009. The Swedish decline in GDP growth was not 
exceptional in a Nordic perspective if Norway is excluded. But the fall in GDP growth 
2008-2009 was larger in Sweden than in the Euro area and the OECD on average. The 
reason is mainly that Swedish openness was a disadvantage during the deep international 
recession. Given her economic specialization in products that are sensitive to the business    80 
cycle (raw materials and investment goods), Sweden was particularly hit by the Great 
Recession. 
 
In 2008-2009, the decline in Swedish employment was not as dramatic as the fall in GDP 
growth. Productivity growth was therefore significantly reduced in Sweden in an 
international, although not in a Nordic, perspective (including 2007 data in the 
Norwegian case). As in other OECD countries (but not in the United States, Spain and 
Iceland), productivity growth was reduced during the Great Recession because of 
extensive labour hoarding.
31 The period with low productivity growth, beginning already 
in the boom year 2007, put an end to the Swedish growth miracle.  
 
Is Sweden’s macroeconomic performance during the Great Recession and the following 
recovery evidence for the success or failure of the new economic-policy regime? The 
country was praised e.g. by the OECD for her strong government budget, absence of a 
housing bubble and of bank crisis. Swedish experts were hired by other countries to 
convey valuable experiences from the Swedish bank crisis in the early 1990s when the 
non-socialist government had provided financial support to the banks, and had also 
implemented nationalization and repayment programs (one bank was actually 
nationalized), see Gylfason et al. 2010, 21. Sweden was also admired abroad for her rapid 
recovery from the Great Recession. In 2010-2011, Sweden experienced high GDP growth 
although the GDP level is still (July 2011) below the GDP level ahead of the 2008 supply 
                                                 
31 OECD (2011, ch. 5). By weakening the built-in-stabilizing effects on the public budget, the modest 
reduction in employment contributed to the small public deficits in Sweden during the financial crisis (see 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 2011, 25-45).     81 
shock and financial crisis. As in other periods of Swedish industrialism, the current 
recovery is export led.  
 
It was a major advantage to Sweden to enter the economic crisis in the late 2000s with 
large public budget surpluses. The Swedish fiscal rules might have played a role for the 
large budget surplus before the crisis. But OECD countries with less restrictive fiscal 
guidelines including the other Nordic countries (cf. the less binding Stability and Growth 
Pact in the Finnish case) also displayed public budget surpluses. And the introduction of 
fiscal rules in Sweden was probably endogenously determined by the changes in 
economic-policy priorities that followed as a response to the budget crisis of the early 
1990s (see the section “Living in the shadow of a deep crisis” above). Whatever the case, 
the Swedish government chose not to use these surpluses for an expansionary fiscal 
policy. Fiscal policy was in fact more expansionary in other OECD countries with a 
similar economic-policy regime.  
 
As “divine coincidence” appeared again, Swedish monetary policy was an easier task in 
2009-2011 than during the stagflation year 2008. The Swedish Central Bank reduced its 
prime rate under deflationary conditions (such as falling input prices) from October 2008 
to July 2009. In 2008 and 2009, the decline in Swedish repo and internal-bank rates was 
similar to that of the corresponding Euro rates. The Swedish Central Bank then increased 
the repo rate in the late 2010 and during the first half of the 2011 to counteract a rising 
inflationary trend. The increase in the ECB key interest rate was more moderate and 
further postponed to April 2011 leading to a significant gap between the internal-bank    82 
rates in Sweden and the euro zone in the 2010-2011 recovery. The advantage of pursuing 
an independent Swedish monetary policy was obvious in the 2008-2011 period. 
Moreover, by extraordinary interventions in monetary markets, the Central Bank and the 
government helped avoid a banking crisis in Sweden. Furthermore, by showing 
considerable wage restraint in the 2010 negotiations, the Swedish collective bargaining 
system, and the wage-leading Industrial Agreement, proved highly capable of adjustment 
during a deep recession. What is more, the system of flexible exchange rates functioned 
as suggested by the macroeconomics textbook. The weakening of the SEK in late 2008 
and in 2009 stimulated the Swedish economy in a recession, and the strengthening of the 
SEK in 2010-2011 offset the impending export-led boom. It seems also (although data 
are preliminary) that the recovery in GDP growth 2010-2011 was faster in Sweden than 
in Finland, a country with an even stronger position for export-oriented raw materials 
industries. Due to the EMU membership, Finland could not command help from a 
weakening currency in its efforts to escape the recession.  
  
This rather idyllic picture of the new economic-policy regime (and the extraordinary 
policy measures) in Sweden 2008-2011 may be countered by the claim that Sweden 
escaped a bank crisis by luck, namely through the fast recovery of the Baltic countries. 
Furthermore, the strong Swedish upswing 2010-2011 largely reflected the country’s 
export orientation and the product and regional composition of her export. Specialization 
in raw materials and investment goods was an advantage to Sweden when the large 
Western European countries recovered. Moreover, the increased weight of Asian markets 
in the regional composition of exports was beneficial to Sweden. The importance of the    83 
East-Asian countries in the upswing phase is a new phenomenon in the history of the 
Swedish business cycle. Thus, the explanation of Sweden’s strong recovery in 2010-2011 
is primarily structural.  
 
Evaluating the performance of the new economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 2008-
2011 period, we must also take account of the increase in unemployment (see Table 4* in 
Appendix 2). Notwithstanding the use of ALMP measures open unemployment rose from 
5.6 percent in January 2008 to 9.1 percent in January 2010, a stronger increase (in 
percentage points) than in the other Nordic countries (with the exception for Denmark) 
and in the other EU countries except for the Baltic and the Mediterranean countries 
excluding Italy. The unemployment performance of Sweden was worse in the late 2000s 
than during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, two earlier periods marked 
by supply shocks and ensuing recession.  What is more, Swedish unemployment in 2008-
2010 was 7.6 per cent on average. Only Finland and Belgium among the small open 
Western European countries had equally high unemployment rates. The Swedish 
unemployment rate was similar to that of total OECD (see Table 1* in Appendix 2).   
 
There is support for the hypothesis that the new macroeconomic policy was successful 
during the Great Recession. But the success must largely be defined in terms of the 
objectives of the new regime itself, without any reference to the medium-term 
unemployment level. The new economic-policy regime in Sweden appears in a more 
favourable light if we compare the unemployment rate at the end of the 2000s to that of 
the early 1990s (using a standardized measure). Monetary policies (together with bailouts    84 
in the financial sector) and flexible exchange rates contributed to a more limited increase 
in Swedish unemployment during the Great Recession. But the propensity for labour 
hoarding among Swedish firms was stronger at the end of the 2000s, and a bank crisis 





A number of measures characteristic of the 1990s and 2000s, particularly the budget 
reforms, the deregulation of labor and product markets, the fiscal rules, the inflation 
targets and the central-bank independence, were introduced earlier and implemented 
more radically in Sweden than in other OECD countries. Sweden’s sudden and resolute 
transition to a new economic-policy regime cannot be understood without reference to the 
deep early 1990s financial crisis and the following public budget crisis. At the same time, 
Swedish economic policy was shaped by new economic ideas, EU integration and the 
influential role of experts in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The power of 
economic professionals increased due to the budget reforms and the new legislation on 
central-bank independence. The professionalism of economic policy was matched by a 
reduction in the influence of other ministries (than the Ministry of Finance) and of labour 
market organizations, especially the central blue-collar federation (LO).  
 
Sweden relied on these new economic-policy routines throughout the 1998-2007 period. 
In an international perspective, Sweden was no longer the country with low 
                                                 
32 Swedish unemployment increased in the early 1990s in all sectors, for all age and ethnic groups and for 
both sexes. The recent economic recession primarily led to higher unemployment among young people and 
among blue-collar workers in manufacturing.    85 
unemployment rates (as in the 1970s and 1980s), but a country with low inflation rates. 
Contractionary monetary policy, not the fiscal rules or restrictive fiscal policy in general, 
was decisive for the relatively low Swedish inflation. At the same time, production 
growth was high in Sweden, a consequence of the ICT sector, and of the revival of the 
traditional export industries stimulated by the upswing in the East-Asian countries. The 
ICT sector, mainly the telecom industries, also explains the Swedish productivity 
(growth) miracle in Sweden between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Moreover, the 
ICT sector contributed substantially to increasing wage gaps and also to low inflation in 
Sweden from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Negative terms-of-trade effects due to 
price reductions on telecom products mitigated pressures that could have caused wage 
inflation in a dynamic economy. And the Central Bank failed to anticipate the huge 
productivity increases in the telecom industries, and thus decided on a monetary policy 
that was more restrictive than was required by the inflation target. Yet, it is impossible to 
decide whether Sweden’s excellent productivity performance was caused by the 
deregulation wave in the 1990s or rather by technological processes, networks and 
capacities (especially in the telecom industries) wholly unrelated to the new economic-
policy regime. 
 
During the Great Recession, Sweden escaped a bank crisis and similarly strong 
employment decline as in the early 1990s. Sweden’s openness and industrial composition 
led to a drastic fall in GDP growth, but these economic-structural conditions also 
facilitated the country’s recovery. An evaluation of the performance of the new 
economic-policy regime during the test period 2008-2011 period must take into account    86 
that the conduct of Swedish monetary policy was facilitated by “divine coincidence” - 
inflation targeting turned out to be compatible with countercyclical monetary policy. 
Sweden benefited from her independent monetary policy, flexible exchange rates and her 
large public savings reducing the risk of a budget crisis and facilitating expansionary 
fiscal policy. But the government did not use the budget surplus to stimulate aggregate 
demand in 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, the fiscal rules of the new economic-policy 
strategy were hardly responsible for the Swedish budget surplus.  
 
Sweden’s macroeconomic success in the 1998-2011 period was less obvious in terms of 
employment. The unemployment rate was lower and the increase in unemployment was 
more moderate during the global financial crisis 2007-2011 than during the homegrown 
financial crises of the early 1990s (at least until the public budget crisis in Southern 
Europe and the United States in the summer of 2011). However, Sweden entered the 
recession with higher rate unemployment in the late 2000s than at the beginning of the 
1990s. The more modest increase in Swedish unemployment during the Great Recession 
is explained not only by the expansionary monetary policy, but also by labour hoarding 
and luck. The new economic-policy regime in Sweden was thus helped by some 
favourable external conditions. In addition, the interruption of the stagflation process in 
2008 made monetary policy an easier task. New increases in energy and food prices, 
together with a growing discontent with the deregulation of the labour and product 
markets, are the major challenges to the new Swedish economic-policy regime in the 
2010s. 
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Appendix 1: Swedish governments during the postwar period 
 
 
July 1945 - October 1951  Social democratic majority government. Prime Minister: Per Albin 
Hansson (1945-46), Tage Erlander (1946-51). 
 
October 1951 - October 1957  Two-party coalition majority government, the Social Democratic Party 
and the Agrarian Party (Bondeförbundet, Centerpartiet from 1958). 
Prime Minister: Tage Erlander.                                            
 
October 1957 - October 1976  Social democratic majority or minority governments. Main 
parliamentary support: Swedish Communist Party (Sveriges 
Kommunistiska Parti, Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna from 1967). Even 
seats in  Parliament for the non-socialist and socialist block 1973-76. 
Prime Minister: Tage Erlander (1957-69), Olof Palme (1969-76). 
   
October 1976 - October 1978  Centre-right (non-socialist) coalition majority government, 
Centerpartiet (the Centre Party), Folkpartiet (the Liberal Party) and 
Moderata Samlingspartiet (the Conservative Party).  Prime Minister: 
Torbjörn Fälldin (Centerpartiet). 
 
October 1978 - September 1979  Liberal minority government. Prime Minister: Ola Ullsten 
(Folkpartiet). 
 
October 1979 - May 1981                Centre-right (non-socialist) three-party coalition majority government,  
Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet and Moderata Samlingspartiet. Prime 
Minister: Torbjörn Fälldin. 
 
May 1981 - October 1982  Centre-right (non-socialist) two-party coalition minority government, 
Centerpartiet and Folkpartiet.  Prime Minister: Torbjörn Fälldin. 
 
October 1982 - October 1991  Social democratic minority government. Prime Minister: Olof Palme 
(1982-86, Ingvar Carlsson (1986-91). Main parliamentary support: 
Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (Vänsterpartiet, the Left Party) from 
1990). 
 
October 1991 - October 1994  Centre-right (non-socialist) four-party coalition minority government, 
                                                         Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet  Liberalerna (Folkpartiet until 1990),     94 
                                                         Kristdemokratiska samhällspartiet (Christian Democratic Party) and  
Moderata Samlingspartiet. Prime Minister: Carl Bildt (Moderata 
Samlingspartiet). Main parliamentary support: Ny Demokrati (New 
Democracy). 
 
October 1994 - October 2006  Social Democratic minority government. Prime Minister: Ingvar 
Carlsson (1994-96), Göran Persson (1996-2006). Main parliamentary 
support: Vänsterpartiet, September 1994 - January 1995, Centerpartiet, 
January 1995 – Autumn 1998, Vänsterpartiet (the Left Party) and 
Miljöpartiet (the Green Party), Autumn 1998 - September 2006. 
 
October 2006 -   Centre-right (non-socialist) four-party coalition majority government 
2006-2010, minority government 2010- , Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet 
Liberalerna, Kristdemokraterna (Kristdemokratiska  samhällspartiet 
until 1996) and Moderata Samlingspartiet. Prime Minister: Fredrik 
Reinfeldt (Moderata Samlingspartiet). After the 2010 election the 
balance of power between the centre-right coalition and the left-green 
opposition rested on a new party in Parliament 2010: 
Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats). 
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Appendix 2: Macroeconomic statistics 
 
Table 1*: Standardized unemployment rates in OECD countries 1992-1997, 1998-2007 
and 2008-2010, annual average percentage rates  
 
        1992-97    1998-2007    2008-2010 
      _____________________________________________________ 
 
Sweden      8,7      6,7      7,6 
 
Denmark      7,4      4,7      5,6 
 
Finland      14,5      9,0      7,7 
 
Norway      5,6      3,5      3,0 
 
Austria       4,0      4,3      4,3 
 
Belgium      9,0      8,0      7,7 
 
Netherlands      5,9      3,9      3,8 
 
Switzerland      3,4      3,3      3,8 
 




Euro area      10,1      8,8      9,1 
 
United Kingdom    8,8      5,3      7,0 
 
United States      6,1      4,9      8,2 
 
Total OECD      7,4      6,7      7,7 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: OECD (2005b), OECD (2011), Table 14. 
Note: The rate of unemployment in Belgium 1992 was derived by data on unemployment 
1992 and 1993 according to a national measure.   
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Table 2*: Consumer prices indices 1992-1997, 1998-2007 and 2008-2010 (average 
annual percentage changes) 
 
        1992-97    1998-2007    2008-2010 
      _____________________________________________________ 
 
Sweden      2,2      1,2      1,4 
 
Denmark      2,0      2,1      2,3 
 
Finland      1,8      1,5      2,4 
 
Norway      2,4      2,0      2,8 
 
Austria       2,3      1,7      1,8 
 
Belgium      2,0      1,9      2,3 
 
Netherlands      1,9      2,4      1,4 
 
Switzerland      1,9      0,8      0,9 
 




Euro area      3,1      2,0      1,7 
 
United Kingdom    2,6      1,6      3,0 
 
United States      2,8      2,6      1,7 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3*: Labour productivity growth in OECD countries, 1992-1995, 1996-2006 and 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, annual averages. 
 
      1992-95  1996-2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
      ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Sweden    3,6    2,6    1,1  -1,7  -3,3  4,1 
 
Denmark    2,7    1,5    -1,2  -2,9  -2,2  4,3 
 
Finland     4,0    2,2    3,0  -0,6  -5,7  3,5 
 
Norway    3,1    1,6    -1,3  -2,4  -1,0  0,6 
 
Austria     1,8    1,6    1,8  0,5  -3,0  1,2 
 
Belgium    1,7    1,3    1,2  -0,9  -2,3  1,4 
 
Netherlands    1,1    1,3    1,3  0,4  -2,8  2,3 
 
Switzerland    0,8    1,1    1,0  -0,2  -2,6  2,1 
 





Ireland     2,7    2,9    1,9  -2,5  0,6  3,2 
 
Euro area    1,9    1,1    1,1  -0,4  -2,3  2,2 
 
United Kingdom  2,8    1,9    2,0  -0,8  -3,4  1,0 
 
South Korea    5,0    3,7    3,8  1,7  0,6  4,7 
 
United States    1,3    2,1    1,1  0,7  1,7  3,6 
 
Total OECD    1,7    1,8    1,5  -0,1  -1,6  2,9 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4*:  Unemployment January 2010 and changes in unemployment January 2008 
– January 2010 in 16 OECD countries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Jan 2010    % change    Percentage point change 
 
Sweden    9,1      62.5        3.5       
 
Denmark
1)    7.3      135.5        4.2     
 
Finland    9.0      40.6        2.6       
 
Netherlands    4.2      44.8        1.3 
 
Belgium    8.0      14.2        1.0       
 
Germany    7.5      -1.3        -0.1     
 
France   10.1      29.5        2.3     
 
UK
2)    7.8      52.9        2.7 
 
Austria   5.3      26.2        1.1       
 
Italy
3)    8.6      43.3        2.6 
 
Spain    18.8      113.6        10.0 
 
Ireland   13.8      193.6        9.1 
 
Estonia
4)  15.5      166.1        9.3 
 
Latvia    22.9      346.0        17.3     
 
Lithunia
5)  14.6      224.4        10.1 
 
USA    9.7      98.0        4.8 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     
1) December 2008 and 2009  2) November 2007 and November 2009 3) September 2007 4) 
December 2009 5 ) September 2009       
Source: Eurostat 
 